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The Development and Application of the Petraeus Doctrine in the 2007 
Iraq Troop Surge 
 
Luke McCorkel, Washington University in Saint Louis 
Master’s Thesis 
 
Abstract: In Spring 2007 President Bush ordered additional American troops 
to Iraq as part of a troop Surge to wage a counter-offensive based on the tactics of the 
newly developed Petraeus Doctrine.  This thesis analyzes the events leading up to and 
surrounding the Surge and the role of the Petraeus Doctrine the successful defeat of 
the insurgency and strengthening the Iraqi Government and Security Forces enabling 
the Americans to being an orderly withdrawal.   
 
The Petraeus Doctrine did play a vital role in the defeat of the insurgency, but 
it was not the primary cause for the Surge’s success and merely took advantage of an 
emerging situation on the ground that made Baghdad ripe for a counter-insurgency 
campaign.  This situation was the result of a number of factors: a long war that had 
abandoned idealism for pragmatism and the utter failure of conventional Hard Power 
that left a military willing to try anything; improved Iraqi Security Forces that were 
the product of a long-term training program; domestic pressures in the media and 
Congress that forced the Bush Administration to acknowledge how badly things had 
deteriorated and have no choice but to do something; the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad 
that had shifted the violence from neighbor-on-neighbor to neighborhood-on-
neighborhood; and an insurgency that had overplayed its hand combined with 
American domestic politics to make the Americans a more temporary and appealing 
option than the insurgencies.  Ultimately the Petraeus Doctrine played a supporting 
role in the Surge by taking advantage of conditions on the ground, but did not create 
it. 
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Introduction 
On December 18, 2011 the last American convoy rolled across the border of 
Kuwait from Iraq signifying the end of more than eight long years of war.  The intent 
of this thesis is to analyze how a “quick war” of shock, awe and democratization 
evolved into a long bloody slog that saw the Americans reach the point of pulling out 
of Iraq in the face of overwhelming violence, only to decide to wage one last ditch 
gamble in the form of a surge of troops.  This surge was about more than just sending 
in more troops, but was a gamble that the newly developed Petraeus Doctrine based 
on the concept that Smart Power could offer a new approach and defeat the 
insurgency.  By any account the Surge was widely successful, violence dropped more 
than 80 percent in just a matter of months and within a year and a half the Iraqi 
Security Forces would be defeating the insurgents with minimal American support 
enabling the Americans to shift their focus to advising and assisting the Iraqis while 
staging a gradual withdrawal from the country. 
In the first chapter of the thesis, the period from 2003-2005 will be examined.  
During this period American errors and lack of an overarching plan allowed the 
insurgency to grow and take the initiative from the Americans, while their hopes of 
elections and politics stabilizing the situation on the ground failed.  The next chapter 
will cover 2006 when the country descended into all out civil war and a number 
pressures conspired to force the Bush Administration to change course, while behind 
the scenes American commanders tired of the quagmire began to take radical risks 
that were successful in defeating pockets of the insurgency.  Back in the United States 
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General Petraeus was rewriting American counter-insurgency doctrine based on a 
Hard and “Soft Power”1 approach that would eventually be known as “Smart Power”.  
The third chapter will examine the events of the Surge as the Americans used the 
Petraeus Doctrine as part of one last-ditch gamble to defeat the insurgency.  Chapter 
four will focus on the post-Surge period where the newly strengthened Iraqi Security 
Forces began to directly confront the strongest Shi’a militia of Muqtada al-Sadr 
forced them into the political process, while the Iraqi government negotiated a 
timetable for a gradual American withdrawal.  The conclusion will roll up all of the 
events and tactics of the Surge and examine the reason for its success.  Ultimately this 
thesis will examine the roll of the Petraeus Doctrine and circumstances surrounding 
the Surge. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Soft power is the concept that when confronting an enemy often times violence is counterproductive 
and that the best way to “defeat” an enemy is to show mercy and allow for reconstruction and 
reconciliation. 
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Chapter 1: 2003-2005 “How to Win a War, Lose a Victory and 
Create an Insurgency” 
2003- Losing the Peace 
Bypassing the Bad Guys and Claiming Victory 
On March 20, 2003 lead elements of the American 3rd Infantry Division 
crossed the border into Iraq; little did they realize that it would be more than seven 
years and thousands of lives2 before the last Americans began the long dusty drive 
south into Kuwait.  The American plan was a daring one, bypassing major urban 
areas they would head straight to Baghdad to remove Saddam Hussein in hopes that 
they could get there before he used his mythical Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) or had the opportunity to flee to disappear in the same manner as Osama Bin 
Laden had.  This plan would spare the Iraqi infrastructure from large collateral 
damage associated with major urban fighting and minimize the time and cost of post-
war reconstruction. 
By any metric the invasion of Iraq was a major success.  During the first week 
of April American forces had surrounded Baghdad and began to push directly into the 
city and by April 11th the city had fallen3.  On May 2nd President Bush famously 
declared victory from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln signaling 
the end of direct combat operations.  For comparison, during the often vaunted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Tan, Michelle.  “Hood BCT Moving From Iraq to Kuwait.” Army Times, November 10, 2011. 
 
3 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor,  Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and 
Occupation of Iraq.  (New York: Vintage Press, 2007), 498. 
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German Blitzkrieg of Poland it took German troops 27 days to advance 150 miles to 
Warsaw4, while the Americans advanced 350 miles in 18 days to Baghdad5. 
During the invasion the Americans expected to be welcomed with open arms 
in the same way as their forefathers had during the World War 2 campaign to liberate 
Europe.  In contrast the Americans were not widely welcomed as liberators and failed 
to understand the degree of hatred that 10 years of sanctions and failure to support 
uprisings (which the Americans had inspired) had incurred.  The Iraqi military had 
also used the decade of peace since the First Gulf War to prepare for an expected 
second round of fighting.  The 1991 Gulf War had seen the utter futility of fighting 
the Americans toe-to-toe in the open desert, but the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu6 had 
illustrated that large numbers of irregular fighters in an urban area could negate 
American technology and hurt them enough to force them to withdraw due to 
domestic political pressures.  During the 2003 invasion the Americans found 
themselves unable to confront the Iraqi military in the desert and countryside, instead 
they were drawn into a complex urban fight where the enemy would attack, retreat, 
then re-infiltrate when the Americans had moved on.  This was further exacerbated by 
the American strategy of pushing to Baghdad at all costs with minimal presence.  An 
example is the Battle of Nasiriya in which the Marines fought hard to push the Iraqis 
out of the city so that forces headed to Baghdad could pass through then withdrawing 
and leaving token forces guarding the bridges when they had.  This left Saddam’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mosier, John, The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of 
World War II (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), 91.   
 
5 Gordon, Cobra II, 419. 
 
6 This was the battle immortalized in the movie Blackhawk Down where a number of irregular fighters 
with nothing more than AK-47s and RPGs caused heavy casualties among American elite fighters that 
led to President Clinton’s order to withdraw from Somalia. 
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Fedayeen irregular fighters free to re-infiltrate and use as a base to attack American 
logistical convoys There was a further clash with American expectations when the 
Iraqi soldiers did not surrender, instead they simply changed out of their uniforms and 
took their guns and went home7.  
During the Battle of Baghdad the Americans fought a bitter five-day move 
into the city, only to see the Iraqi military fade away when it became clear that Iraqi 
Army would eventually lose control of the city.  Unfortunately with the disintegration 
of the Iraqi Army came a disintegration of the rule of law.  During the days that 
followed the infrastructure that the Americans had spent so much effort in preserving 
was utterly destroyed by massive looting by Iraqi civilians while the Americans 
passively stood by and watched; lacking the numbers, plans or orders to intervene.  
The American ambivalence can best be illustrated by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
who famously said that “stuff happens” and compared the looting in Iraq, that was 
tearing down billions of dollars in infrastructure, to what happens post-soccer game 
chaos.  Rumsfeld even went so far as to joke that television footage of the looting was 
that of a single looter being broadcast over and over8.  The looting would lower the 
Iraqi standard of living and rob Iraqi institutions of state of the tools necessary to 
resume functioning9.  The most grave failure of the Americans in the days following 
the invasion was to protect guard Iraqi Army bases and weapons depots from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
7 Ibid 567. 
 
8 Rich, Frank.  “Stuff Happens Again in Baghdad.” New York Times, September 24, 2006.  Accessed 
November 14, 2011. 
 
9 Peter Slevin, and Dana Priest.  “Wolfowitz Concedes Iraq Errors.” Washington Post, July 23, 2003.  
Accessed November 14, 2011. 
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looting, this flooded Iraq with up to a million tons of weapons, ammunition and 
explosives that the budding insurgency would use to great effect10.   
The Coalition Provisional Authority Makes a Mess 
By late April the Americans had hastily created the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) to serve as a caretaker government for Iraq until the Americans 
could transfer sovereign control to a post-Saddam Iraqi state.  From the outset the 
CPA was undermanned and had massive turnover, a large number of the employees 
saw employment as a stopgap until they could return to the US to work on the Bush 
reelection campaign.  This led to the CPA having a degree of naiveté catalyzed by the 
hubris of a quick, cheap victory that bred a dangerous idealism.  An example is how 
the CPA used significant resources to wage an anti-smoking campaign, revamp the 
Iraqi tax code and rewrite pharmaceutical regulations for hospitals while Baghdad 
began to burn.   
The most egregious and self-defeating actions the CPA took were the first 
orders that it issued.  CPA Order 1 permanently banned any former member of the 
Ba’ath party from employment in the public sector.  Under Saddam membership in 
the Ba’ath party was required for teachers, military officers, and other mid-level 
bureaucrats. Experts on post-conflict reconstruction, government and even American 
military officers vehemently protested this action; instead they called for only 
removing the “thugs” who had carried out humanitarian rights abuses11.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
10 United States Government Accountability Office.  The Congressional Record—Senate, October 17, 
2003,  (Government Accountability Office, 2003) 25091. 
 
11 Bennett, Brian.  “Sorting the Bad From The Not So Bad.”  Time Magazine, May 19, 2003.  Accessed 
November 12, 2011. 
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CPA Order 2 permanently disbanded the Iraqi Army.  During the 1980s the 
Iraqi Army had proudly defended the homeland from the feared Persians, then fought 
a Thermopylae-like battle against a coalition of the entire world.   The sheer scale and 
high stakes of the Iran-Iraq War and the First Gulf War fighting had forced the Iraqi 
Army to be a meritocratic and non-sectarian12, especially since most of the fighting 
was in the predominately Shi’a areas.  This is in stark contrast to the armies of most 
authoritarian regimes, which are usually packed with the regimes supporters and used 
to maintain domestic rule.  Most Iraqis were proud of their Army and their Soldiers 
were proud to have valiantly defended their homes.  In a culture that values saving 
face and honor above all else the Americans had unintentionally sent a major slight to 
an institution of national pride. 
CPA Order 2 was in sharp contrast to prewar propaganda hat promised Iraqi 
Soldiers that if they did not fight the American invasion the Americans would let 
bygones be bygones, going so far as to ensure that Iraqi Soldiers would receive back 
pay for any missed pay periods.  Naturally Iraqi Soldiers assumed that after the 
fighting had ebbed they would be called back to the Army. In the chaos surrounding 
the fall of Baghdad Iraqi Officers in the Ministry of Defense went so far as to stash 
the payroll records of the entire Army in their homes for safe keeping to help speedy 
reconstitution of the Army.  After CPA Order 2 the American Army would spend the 
next several years trying to recreate a non-sectarian, stable, and independent Iraqi 
Army whose unit ironically trace their linage directly back to the Army the CPA had 
just disbanded and it would be several years before the Iraqis were an addition instead 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
12 This excludes the elite Republican Guard, which was predominantly Sunni and utterly loyal to 
Saddam. 
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of a drain on American resources13.  At the individual level, Soldiers in the Iraqi 
Army were proud of service to their nation and took CPA Order 2 as an affront to 
their personal honor and sense of identity.  The end result of CPA Order number 2 
was to create a class of disaffected young men who were trained, armed, experienced 
and angry with the Americans. 
 
How Do You Fight An Insurgency? 
 As the American occupation continued on into the summer and fall of 
2003 American military commanders found themselves increasingly fighting a 
nascent insurgency without overarching policy or doctrine14.  Into this vacuum each 
division commander was left to develop their own policies and procedures for their 
area of operations.  A debate began within American military circles as to how best 
quell the insurgency should commanders use overwhelming amounts of force and 
hard power to directly confront and destroy the insurgency or should they use soft 
power’s to focus on keeping potential insurgents engaged in politics and 
reconstruction while offering to rehabilitate the insurgents themselves.   A case study 
can be made between General Odierno’s 4th Infantry Division in the “Sunni Triangle” 
15 which used hard power and General Petraeus’s 101st Airborne Division in Mosul 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
13 Thomas E Ricks,  The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2009) 278. 
 
14 Though the Army and Marine Corps each had counterinsurgency manuals they had not been updated 
since the early 1980s [Department of the Army.  Field Manuel 3-24: Counterinsurgency.  Washington: 
Department of the Army, 2006.] 
 
15 This was anchored roughly in the north by Tikrit, the east by Baghdad, the west by Ramadi and was 
the predominate powerbase of Saddam’s regime. 
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that mostly used soft power, with the other division commanders falling somewhere 
in the middle. 
General Odierno’s believed that the reason for the rising insurgency is that the 
Iraqi Army had not been defeated on the battlefield and did not view itself as such.  
The solution was to use force and coercion (such as sweeps, raids on civilian homes, 
and large amounts of firepower) to directly attack the insurgency and leave its 
members dead or captured.  Of particular note was the use of heavily armed presence 
patrols in Humvees and other armored vehicles; this was a technique that the 
Americans had use to great success in Kosovo during the previous decade where they 
were welcomed by the ethnically divided populace to keep tensions from reigniting, 
but unlike Kosovo the demographics of the Sunni Triangle were largely homogenous.  
The locals did not need security to prevent violence, but rule of law.  These American 
patrols barreled through Iraqi towns with guns aggressively pointing out at the locals, 
forcing them off the road, refusing to stop to the point of driving on sidewalks and 
into oncoming traffic.  The Iraqis took these actions as the Americans as occupiers 
with an attitude of “I’m here, I’m coming through, and there is nothing you can do 
about it”.  Instead of being treated as a newly liberated people ready to take their 
country in a proud new direction in partnership with the American allies, instead the 
Iraqis felt they were being paternalistically treated as if they had to be protected from 
themselves16 and found such treatment offensive and degrading.  
The Americans would detain all the male members of household near where 
they attacked or found weapons without making even a token attempt to investigate 
who was actually implicated, instead simply dropping them off at Abu Ghraib.  This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ricks, Fiasco, 312. 
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swelled the prisoner population and overwhelmed guards and interrogators, which 
directly contributed to later abuses.  Administrative personnel at the prison were 
unable to track or report who had been detained to prisoner’s families. Iraqis would 
be detained for simply being at the wrong place at the wrong time and just disappear 
for months at a time.  This built large-scale resentment against the Americans by both 
those who were detained as well as their families17. 
Critics of General Odierno’s hard power charged that the heavy handed tactics 
were counter-productive and that by aggressively attacking the insurgency he was 
building support for the insurgents in the community.  The critics argued that he 
should have been attempting to build goodwill in the heart of Saddam’s base of power 
to bring his former supporters into the political process and give them a stake in the 
post-Saddam Iraqi government.  Though later events would prove the critics correct, 
it was unclear at the time.  What was clear is that General Odierno’s troops were 
killing and detaining insurgents, disrupting their cells and finding weapons caches 
while in the face of rising violence18.   
 General David Petraeus’s 101st Airborne Division in Mosul chose to 
take a different approach more focused on Soft Power’s political engagement and 
lessened emphasis on force, but he also faced completely different circumstances.  
Instead of a Sunni hegemony, Mosul was an area that had been historically Kurdish, 
but Saddam had expelled the Kurds and replaced them with Sunni Arabs.  General 
Petraeus’s basic mission was a race against time to prevent an Arab-Kurdish civil war 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ricks, Fiasco, 199. 
 
18 Gonzales, Daniel , John Hollywood, Jerry M. Sollinger, James McFadden, John DeJarnette, Sarah 
Harting and Donald Temple. Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 
and 1/25 Stryker Brigades in Northern Iraq, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007) 112. 
	  -­‐11-­‐	  
from breaking out.  With this mission he understood that violence begets violence and 
instead decided to build support of the locals and give both sides a stake in the 
government so they wouldn’t feel a need to resort to violence19.  To not alienate the 
locals General Petraeus put restrictions on his unit’s use of violence, allowing it to 
only be used sparingly and precisely.  When his unit wanted to conduct a raid to 
detain an insurgent it would contact the elite Special Forces to conduct the raid very 
precisely with their vastly superior equipment and training while conventional forces 
pulled security and support.  For example, in one such raid 23 out of 35 targets were 
detained with one shot fired20.  In return General Petraeus would provide firepower 
and numbers associated with a conventional unit when the Special Forces requested it 
for their missions. 
 General Petraeus pushed to rebuild Mosul as rapidly as possible to 
give the locals a stake in both reconstruction as well as the new Iraqi state.  Not 
wanting to wait for reconstruction funds from Baghdad or Washington, General 
Petraeus immediately began to fund reconstruction projects through use of his 
Commander’s Emergency Response Fund (CERP)21 and fund from remaining pre-
war institutions, at one point even going so far as to assert himself as the new leader 
in the area to order Iraqi bankers to fund his projects22.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
19 Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends, 37. 
 
20 Ibid, 39. 
 
21 During the entire Iraq War unit commander’s were given a discretionary spending fund based on 
unit size, mission and time period. 
 
22 Gonzales et al. Networked Forces in Stability Operations, 129. 
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 Mosul is more than 350 kilometers from Baghdad, which gave General 
Petraeus the geographical ability to resist the immediate implementation of CPA 
Orders 1 and 2.  Petraeus argued that firing a group of well-connected mid-level 
bureaucrats would be akin to handing the insurgency a core group of leaders.  Before 
being ordered to disband the Iraqi Army, Petraeus had already been in contact with an 
Iraqi Officer’s association to engage and keep a feel on the pulse within the 
community of those with the training and leadership to fight.  When faced with CPA 
Order 2 General Petraeus proposed to keep the officers appeased by having a posh 
retirement ceremony acknowledging the honorable accomplishments of the officers, 
giving them a medal, then inviting them back into a new organization the next day.  
General Petraeus warned that the two CPA Orders would lead to the alienation of two 
important segments of society would lead to unrest and resisted their impementation, 
but was overruled when head of the CPA Paul Bremer III personally contacted the 
Pentagon in order to have them directly order Petraeus to implement the orders23.  
Unfortunately Petraeus was proved correct when protests started almost immediately 
and violence began to escalate. 
 In early 2004 General Petraeus’s unit was replaced by another one 
roughly half its size lacking the forces on the ground to continue his approach nor did 
the incoming commander have show desire to do so.  Subsequently Mosul would 
explode with the rest of Iraq during the spring 2004.   
Ultimately General Petraeus’s approaches would prove an interesting 
experiment in counterinsurgency.  Though successful in keeping a lid on Arab-Kurd 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
23 Ricks, Fiasco, 229. 
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violence, critics at the time charged that his success was temporary and unsustainable 
because he was simply buying off the insurgents who were happy to take money and 
time to organize and would inevitably emerge strengthened at a time and place of 
their choosing.  Instead they argued that he should have taken the focused on rooting 
out former Ba’athists and fighting the insurgency, while leaving political 
reconstruction to the civilians24. 
Leaving the Cities 
 Another other major development during 2003 was the withdrawal of 
American troops onto increasingly large bases on the edges of major cities as the 
troops withdrew from small primitive outposts they had initially occupied deep in the 
cities.  This allowed for simplified and safer logistics, better command and control, 
and better living conditions for soldiers.  This withdrawal signified the beginnings of 
an anti-body paradigm25it was hoped that a smaller American footprint in the cities 
would result in less violence as well as prove less antagonistic toward local Iraqis.  
Yet as the Americans were expanding, fortifying and improving their bases without 
rhetoric of a withdrawal Iraqis saw the beginnings of a permanent presence reeking of 
neo-colonialism. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately the narrative of 2003 was one of a textbook perfect lightening 
invasion, but then lack of post-war direction drove the growth of an insurgency.  Lack 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
24 Woodward, State of Denial, 209. 
 
25 The anti-body theory was the official belief that much like anti-bodies in the blood draw the viruses 
in order to attack them, when the Americans went into an area they were drawing the insurgents into 
attacks whereby without the American presence they would not have caused violence. 
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of security in the days following the invasion led to looting that destroyed Iraqi 
infrastructure and flooded the country with stolen munitions.  The CPA issued ill-
conceived directives that disenfranchised bureaucrats and dishonored Soldiers driving 
them into the insurgency and providing the nascent insurgency with its leaders and 
foot soldiers.  Lacking coherent doctrine each American division commander was left 
to fight his own war as a debate emerged about the effectiveness of hard vs. soft 
power.  Unfortunately 2004 would provide no verdict as the entire country descended 
into the chaos of insurgency. 
2004: Losing and Retaking the Cities 
American Goals 
 In early 2004 the American goals were: complete the withdraw of American 
troops from the cities, have the CPA transfer political control to the sovereign Iraqi 
Interim Government and set the stage for parliamentary elections in January, 200526.  
Though seemingly simple, the American goals were underlain with major issues. 
American withdrawal from the cities meant effectively ceding the control to the 
insurgents whenever the Americans were not actively present which, due to the 
endemic shortage of enough troops, was far too often.  The fewer number of bases 
meant that it was relatively easy for the insurgents to monitor when the Americans 
were going to be present so they could lay low and to plan ambushes and IEDs on the 
predictable routes between bases and cities/neighborhoods.  The American goals led 
to a fundamentally flawed American strategy of using democratic politics to create 
security and rule of law.  Subsequent events would prove the opposite.  Comparing 	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the CPA’s transfer of political authority to the Iraqi Interim Government in 2004 with 
the American handover of security responsibility of Anbar province to the Iraqi 
military in 2008 is an example of this.  The former had to be accomplished by June 
30, 2004, but was done ahead of schedule and in secret to prevent insurgent 
interruption (which the Americans would have been unable to prevent) in a small 
ceremony in the heavily fortified Green Zone and was not even announced until 
Bremer was on a flight back to the United States27.  The latter was a lavish, formal 
public ceremony carried out in the streets after a parade with the Americans not even 
wearing armor, helmets or carrying weapons, but was done after heavy, costly 
fighting by an American-Iraqi alliance to defeat the insurgents28. 
A Growing Insurgency 
 By spring 2004 Iraq was ripe for an insurgency.  While the Americans 
had driven a disaffected class of unemployed soldiers and former Ba’athists into the 
arms of the insurgency while destroying the good will of the Iraqi populace through 
heavy-handed operations.  At the same time the American units that had carried out 
the invasion were beginning to be rotated out and replaced.  Arab culture is one where 
politics is carried out largely by personal relationships and interactions; so incoming 
units effectively found their relationships with the Iraqis reset29.  Catalyzing the 
situation was growing animosity and frustration with the failure of a return to 
prosperity compared with that of Kuwait after the 1991 war.  Many Iraqis began to 
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28 Filkins, Dexter “U.S. Hands Off Pacified Anbar, Once Heart of Iraq Insurgency” The New York 
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suspect that the Americans were more concerned with neo-colonialism than in 
helping them recover from the fighting.  This meant that by early spring 2004 the 
insurgents had support, the time to organize and desire to wage full-scale campaign 
against the insurgency.  
Sadr: Round 1 
Muqtada al-Sadr was a son of a very popular ayatollah who had been one of 
few clerics to oppose Saddam, only to be cast into martyrdom with his 1999 
assassination by Saddam agents.  Following the fall of Baghdad, the neighborhood of 
Saddam City had been renamed Sadr City in his honor, while his son quietly stepped 
into the power vacuum and built a political party of young imams and the Jaish al-
Mahdi militia of poor, unemployed and disaffected Shi’a youth.  Sadr routinely 
denounced the U.S.; mostly by denouncing it for not supporting the 1991 Shi’a 
uprising and blaming it for the looting after the fall of Baghdad.  Though Sadr’s 
rhetoric was vehemently anti-American, he largely stayed out of military 
confrontation and focused his militia on skirmishing with the better-established 
militias that had been trained and armed by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.  The lack 
of attacks gave American the impression that the Jaish al-Mahdi only possessed small 
arms, and were unaware of the Jaish al-Mahdi stockpiling RPGs and explosives for 
IEDs so they largely left Sadr alone to focus on other threats; this left him free to 
organize his militia and stockpile weapons30. 
Things came to a head with Sadr on March 28, 2004, when Bremer ordered 
Sadr’s newspaper “Al Hawza” shut-down, accusing in it of perpetuating lies about the 
American presence.  Within hours protests had erupted throughout the Shi’a areas of 	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Baghdad and brought life to a standstill.  On April 4th an American convoy was 
ambushed in Sadr City that kicked off a major Jaish al-Mahdi offensive in Sadr City, 
Najaf, Karbala, Basra and Nasiriya with the Jaish al-Mahdi overrunning virtually all 
Iraqi Police and Army positions in the cities31.  The offensive left the Americans 
reeling in surprise at its unity, coordination and sophistication.  An example of this is 
of how when a large American convoy of armored vehicles left Baquba to move 
south as reinforcements for forces fighting in Najaf; insurgents used cell phones to 
relay where the Americans were headed so insurgents in that area could destroy the 
bridges and plant IEDs32.  This made the movement last four times as long as 
expected and take numerous casualties.    
 By the end of May both sides were exhausted from weeks of heavy fighting 
and were ready for a cease-fire.  The Americans agreed to respect Sadr’s control of 
Najaf and Sadr City.  In return he agreed to get rid of all the Jaish al-Mahdi’s heavy 
weapons and only retain small arms, which did not happen33.  Both sides realized that 
the cease-fire was nothing more than a temporary lull in the fighting and both sides 
used it as time to rearm, reequip and rebuild weapons stockpiles. 
“Fallujah”  
 While the Army was fighting Sadr in Baghdad and the South, the 
Marines found themselves engaged in their most intense urban fighting since Vietnam 
War in the western Sunni city of Fallujah.  When the staff of the 1st Marine Division 	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33 Kozlowski, Francis X. The Battle of An-Najaf.  (Washington DC: History Division United States 
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began to plan to return to Iraq in late 2003 they devised a mostly soft-power approach 
based on institutional memory of waging successful anti-insurgency campaigns 
during the Banana Wars, Haiti and the Philippines.  First the Marines would use the 
“reset” in relations caused by their replacement of the Army as an advantage to 
reengage with the population while gradually pushing forces into the cities where 
they would construct small bases to reassert a permanent presence34.  This would 
allow the Marines to establish relations with the locals, reassert the rule of law and 
provide a secure environment for the reconstruction and reestablishment of the Iraqi 
institutions of state.  Three years later similar tactics would be used during the Surge 
to retake Baghdad.  Unfortunately, events shifted before the tactics could be tried. 
On March 31, 2004 Marine plans for a shift in strategy came crashing down 
when four Blackwater contractors were ambushed in their unarmored SUV35.  After 
being ambushed the Blackwater contractors were burned, dismembered and hung 
from a bridge by an angry mob.  When the media released photos of the bodies 
hanging from the bridge, the uproar was almost instantaneous, and an indignant Bush 
Administration ordered an immediate large-scale attack.  When General Mattis, the 
overall commander of forces in Anbar, requested permission to wage a police style 
operation, so as to avoid destroying an entire city for the actions of a few hundred, he 
was ordered to immediately attack “with the power of a Marine division”36.  He also 
argued that a spontaneous attack was not militarily sound and would not allow the 
careful planning and preparation characteristic of most successful large-scale military 
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operations.  He his staff would not have the time to infiltrate snipers or carefully 
construct intelligence estimates.  Even worse his forces would not have time to 
stockpile resources, forcing them to rely on continued resupply by vulnerable 
convoys on predictable route that would be heavily attacked by insurgents supporting 
those in the cities forcing unnecessary casualties and equipment losses37.  
But General Mattis was overruled and on April 5 American Marines attacked 
the city in a massive operation; fighting was fierce, large areas of the city damaged or 
destroyed and many civilians killed.  As American forces neared the center of the city 
they were suddenly ordered to halt by a Bush administration bowing to pressures that 
were created by images and videos released by the media of the city being destroyed 
and civilians killed.  On April 28 the Marines were ordered to turn over control of the 
city to the Fallujah Brigade, a unit hastily created by the CIA around a Saddam Era 
General who had approached the Americans promising to retake the city.  It was 
obvious from the outset that this was simply a move by the Americans to withdraw 
from the city while trying to save face.  Within weeks the entire unit had deserted the 
city and the insurgents were firmly in control38. 
A Second Round of Fighting 
As temperatures soared during the early summer all the sides took the 
opportunity to lick their wounds in preparation for an American counterattack to 
reassert their presence in preparation for parliamentary elections in early 2005.  In 
early August the Americans attacked the Jaish al-Mahdi in Najaf.  After 24 days of 
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intense fighting they were only 100 meters from the Imam Ali Mosque, which the 
Jaish al-Mahdi had been using as their main base39.  The Americans had not attacked 
the mosque directly due to potential wide ranging political ramifications, but as the 
Americans closed in on the mosque damage, was looking increasingly inevitable even 
though Jaish al-Mahdi defeat was inevitable.  At this point Grand Ayatollah 
al-Sistani, the leading Shi’a cleric in Iraq, stepped in to mediate a ceasefire whereby 
the Jaish al-Mahdi fighters would surrender their weapons, but allowed to leave the 
city unmolested.  This would leave the Americans with at least nominal control of the 
city. 
In Fallujah both sides spent the summer preparing; the Americans built berms 
all around the city, dropped leaflets encouraging civilians to leave and stockpiled 
munitions; while the insurgents fortified their positions, planted hundreds of booby 
traps and hid hundreds of arms caches.  During November the Americans waged the 
largest conventional operation of the Iraq War.  Hundreds died and the city was 
nearly destroyed, and by mid-December the last pockets of resistance had been 
mopped up40. 
Training the Iraqis 
 During the spring fighting the post-invasion hastily organized Iraqi Security 
Forces41 all but collapsed in the face of fighting the insurgency; their training had 	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been poorly coordinated, haphazard and ineffectual.  It was so bad that entire units 
would desert when ordered into combat.  The number of Iraqi troops reported as 
trained or in training dropped from 145 thousand in June to 91 thousand in August42.  
As a result in June 2004, the Americans decided to consolidate all training of Iraqi 
Security Forces under a single command and assigned put newly promoted 
Lieutenant General Petraeus in command.  Petraeus’s vision was that training troops 
and forming commands takes time so he designed a strategy that took a long-term 
vision and without promises of a hasty exit.  This was one of the first large-scale 
American strategies predicated on a “long war” and a sign of how the American 
military was beginning to understand there were no quick answers in Iraq.  Instead of 
cobbling together large numbers of men, calling them a unit, appointing commanders 
and throwing them into combat, Petraeus’s plan was to form a unit at the most basic 
level (the 50 man platoon) then adopt a led, lead, leave model with gradually larger 
units.  In this way the Iraqi units would have to follow American leadership, then they 
would take the lead with the Americans acting as front seat passengers.  The final step 
was for them to act independently so the Americans could leave their areas of 
operation43.  As they grew proficient at the platoon level, they would be merged into 
companies, then battalions, then brigades, then divisions, and then finally an 
independent Army; at that point the Americans would have trained themselves out of 
a job. 	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Conclusion of 2004 
 The result of 2004 in Iraq was that American military commanders and 
Bush Administration politicians claimed victories because though they had initially 
lost control of much of the country they had fought major battles resulting in 
insurgent safe-havens cleared and thousands of insurgents killed.  This was the 
ultimate test of American use of hard power.  If they could retain control of the cities 
during 2005 it would vindicate the hard power approach.  During the lead up to the 
elections the Americans claimed control of the entire country.  Unfortunately the 
reality on the ground was very different and much as in Vietnam the generals and 
Washington claimed victory while those on the ground found themselves facing more 
numerous and lethal direct attacks, while IEDs grew more powerful and 
sophisticated.  Troops on the ground and Iraqi civilians alike realized that American 
control was nominal at best and as soon as a patrol was gone, the insurgents were in 
control.  Meanwhile Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence began as the insurgents used violence as a 
political tool in coming elections and a nascent civil war began.   
There was a small degree of hope, after General Petraeus reformed training of 
the Iraqi Security Forces, which increasingly began to show up on the battlefield 
reliably and effectively.  Though first only as small units in support roles the Iraqi 
security forces would slowly but steadily improve and grow, even in the face of a 
larger, more lethal insurgency44.  There was a contraction in this success because as 
the slow and steady process began to bear fruit, Washington was still calling for a 
quick Iraqization and American withdrawal after the elections, without understanding 	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that the very reason the program was successful was because it was founded in a 
long-war strategy. 
2005- Elections and Insurgent “Whack-a-Mole” 
In January 2005 the Americans felt they had weakened the insurgency to the 
point that the elections were viable, so they helped the Interim Iraqi Government 
organize votes on National Council of Representatives, to write a constitution, and 
form Provincial Governing Councils.  To ensure security the Americans and Iraqi 
Security Forces took a number of measures: first the Americans deployed a brigade of 
3,500 additional Soldiers; carried many military of operations as they possibly could 
to put pressure on the insurgents; and finally passive security measures, such as 
banning non-military vehicles from the roads.  Though the Americans would be 
present to help ensure security, during the elections themselves they were banned 
from going within 500 meters of the polling places.  On election day these measures 
were effective, insurgent attacks were minimal and The International Crisis Group 
proclaimed the elections fairly held; but ultimately the elections were a failure as a 
number of key constituencies boycotted the elections and chose not to participate in 
the political process robbing it of legitimacy and support that a stable Iraqi 
government would need to participate45.  One of the key successes of the 2007 Surge 
would be that it sufficiently weakened these constituencies to the point that the only 
tools they had left to use were political and if they failed to use them they risked 
irrelevance. 	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 Muqtada al-Sadr chose not to support and participate in the elections, instead 
disallowing his organization from political involvement in the Iraqi government so 
long as the American occupation continued.  In addition to reaffirming his anti-
Americanism this sent signals that he didn’t have to participate in the government to 
be strong and distancing himself from political fallout if it took an anti-Shi’a stance or 
collapsed completely46.  Yet at the same time he hedged his bets by quietly allowing 
followers to run as independents, meaning that he was a de facto power within the 
government and the door was open if he chose to participate later. 
 The elections in the Sunni areas, particularly the province of Anbar, 
were complete and utter failures.  The Iraqi Tribes47 and the Al Qaeda in Iraq, called 
for a boycott of the election, threatening to kill any who voted and observed the 
polling stations for later retaliatory action with the Americans and Iraqi Security 
forces powerless to stop them.  The resulting lack of Sunni investment in the Iraqi 
Government helped fuel the summer fighting against what they saw as an illegitimate 
government and foreign occupiers.  But there was a glimmer of hope; as 2005 wore 
on and the political process began to grind forward in Baghdad the tribes saw it as 
increasingly fitting the agenda of the Shi’a (and to a lesser degree the Kurds) and 
tribal leaders began to feel the sting of political disengagement and risk of complete 
political disempowerment if the Iraqi government were to succeed. By the December 
elections for parliament these pressures had escalated to the point that the tribes told 
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their member to go to the polls, despite Al Qaeda in Iraq threats to the contrary48.  For 
the first time since the invasion the tribes had broken with their Islamist allies, even 
going so far as to openly skirmish with Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters trying to disrupt the 
elections.  Unfortunately the Americans failed to exploit these tensions, though it is 
unclear if the tribes would have accepted and alliance against Al Qaeda in Iraq  at this 
point, but this break did set an important precedent that tribal interests would come 
before Islamist ideology. 
 While Iraqi politicians were trying to write a constitution and form 
provincial governments, the Americans were trying to keep the insurgency off 
balance enough for them to do so.  The battles of the previous year had shown the 
insurgents that to expel and then defend the Americans from cities and neighborhoods 
was suicide because it just allowed them the opportunity to gather resources and 
firepower for overwhelming attacks.  Instead they would attack the Americans until 
they shifted resources and launched large-scale operations and then slip away to other 
areas leaving IEDs and snipers.  When that area was attacked they would leave to 
another, rinse and repeat.  To the Americans it began to resemble a game of “whack-
a-mole” constantly shifting resources to an insurgency that was popping up seemingly 
everywhere.  It was not that one area would shift troops to an area that was bad, 
everywhere was bad by this point and they were just shifting to areas that were 
horrible.   
Between the 2005 elections the situation in Iraq did not improve, as the 
Americans tried to make space for the government to allow politics to drive security.  	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The situation continued to deteriorate, attacks and casualties continued to escalate, 
while the American Generals promised that the growing number of Iraqi troops would 
provide an elected government the tools to withdraw large numbers of troops the next 
year.  While not understanding that politics needs security and though there were 
steadily larger numbers of Iraqi troops they were still very reliant on American 
leadership and support and it would still be years before they were capable of 
independent operations at higher echelons of command.  Though the Americans were 
killing and detaining large numbers of insurgents and capturing weapons caches the 
lack of a large-scale permanent presence meant that as soon as the Americans had 
returned to their bases the insurgents could freely return.  By the beginning of the 
winter the situation had deteriorated to the point that just as in Vietnam during 1967, 
in 2005 a General in Iraq could tell you of a looming victory while a private could tell 
you of a spiraling defeat.  Just as the Tet Offensive forced Generals and politicians to 
unequivocally recognize the reality of the situation, things were beginning to do the 
same in Iraq. 
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Chapter 2: 2006- Atrocities, Civil War and Gambles 
 Early in 2006 the Americans were facing a fourth year of a war which 
was continuing to spiral out of control with the Americans powerless to stop it.  2006 
would be a climactic year in which American atrocities and all-out civil war would 
force a widespread acknowledgement of how badly the situation had deteriorated.  At 
the same time the Republican defeat during the fall elections would turn both parties 
in Congress against the Bush Administration and force him to change course or face 
Congress cutting the purse strings and forcing an end to the war.  Yet behind the 
scenes there was hope.  In the northern city of Tal Afar Colonel H.R. McMaster was 
wrapping up the first successful counterinsurgency campaign of the war based on a 
radical departure in tactics while in the western province of Anbar the locals were 
beginning to get tired of Al Qaeda in Iraq’s presence which would culminate in an 
all-out alliance with the Americans in a campaign to take back Anbar from the 
insurgents. 
Haditha Killings 
The critical events of 2006 actually began on November 19, 2005 in the town 
of Haditha located in the western province of Anbar when an IED blew up a Marine 
Humvee on patrol, killing one and injuring two others.  In the immediate aftermath 
the Marines went on a rampage through three civilian homes that would leave 16 
women and children dead in addition to 8 military-age males.49 Later the Marines 	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would claim that they were shot at but no weapons were ever found.  After returning 
to base the Marines filed an After-Action Report that was forwarded to (their higher) 
headquarters50.  Nothing about 8 insurgents (as the military-age males were 
immediately classified as) and 16 civilians dead struck higher echelons of command 
as out of the ordinary or unacceptable enough to warrant further investigation. 
The events of Haditha did not begin to come to light until Time Magazine 
reporter Tim McGirk began to investigate after hearing Iraqi rumors of a massacre.  
In January 2006 Mr. McGirk recorded emotional first hand testimony by witnesses 
and survivors as well as cell phone photos of the immediate aftermath51.  When 
McGirk confronted the incoming commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-
I)52 Lieutenant General Chiarelli with the allegations and evidence of the Haditha 
Massacre he immediately requested a copy of the internal investigation’s report.  
When informed that lower level commanders did not feel it warranted an 
investigation, he quickly reprimanded them and ordered an investigation53.    
In March, 2006 McGirk published an article in which he accused the Marines 
of committing a massacre in Haditha54.  This sparked public outrage, and allegations 
of a cover-up were quick to follow.  Yet the American military’s handing of the 
Haditha killings was worse than a cover-up, it was indicative of blatant systemic 	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apathy as to collateral damage and civilian casualties in a country into which they had 
come in the name of democracy and liberation.  
This attitude on the ground of simply trying to survive and kill those who are 
trying to kill you completely neglected the ideas of mission accomplishment, much 
less the greater ideals that the American military and political leaders continued to 
claim.  The reality that things were continuing to spiral uncontrollably downward 
would be further reinforced just three weeks later. 
Bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque 
The Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq is the third holiest shrine in Shi’a 
Islam, its Golden Dome has been a popular place of pilgrimage and worship by Shi’a 
and Sunni alike for centuries55.  In the early hours of February 23, 2006 several 
members of Al Qaeda in Iraq snuck into the Mosque, tied up the guards and planted 
explosives in the dome.  At approximately 6:55 am an explosion rocked the town of 
Samarra as the dome was completely obliterated from Samarra’s skyline56.  News of 
this attack quickly spread throughout the country with almost instant reactions. The 
Iraqi government declared that the only enemy of the Iraqis was terrorism and 
implemented a curfew in Baghdad while the Iraqi and American militaries were put 
on high alert and prepared for Iraqi on Iraqi violence.  As one officer put it “the day 
[the Samarra shrine] blew up every last one of us said it was the beginning of civil 
war in Iraq.”57 Shi’a clerics called on their followers not to attack Sunni Mosques and 
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for the tribes to protect mosques.  Muqtada Al-Sadr took it a step further and called 
on his militia to protect all mosques58. The actions of non-governmental actors were 
indicative of how irrelevant the Iraqi government and security forces had become and 
that they lacked even a pretention of control or ability to project power.  The actions 
of the extra-governmental forces were plays for power and influence within the Iraqi 
society. 
Despite calls for restraint, within hours Shia militiamen and Sunni insurgents 
were actively attacking each other and Iraqi civilians.  In the following five days 
more than 30 mosques were attacked with 1,000 – 1,500 Iraqis being killed every-
day59.  Per the norm the Pentagon and White House downplayed the violence and 
asserted that only 300-400 civilians were being killed and that journalist accounts 
were exaggerations.  But as Wikileaks documents show, those on the ground were 
reporting that same explosion of violence.60  In the weeks and months following, 
Shi’a-Sunni fighting in Baghdad began to take the form of neighborhood ethnic 
cleansing, and those not killed were intimidated to leave.  The Sunnis were on the 
losing end of the fighting with their numbers in Baghdad cut in half as they were 
pushed out of mixed neighborhoods and into their strong-holds by Sadr’s better 
armed and organized Jaish Al-Mahdi.  The result was a Beirut-like division of 
Baghdad that left a once mixed city as firmly divided between Shi’a and Sunni 
neighborhoods as shown in this map.  
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61 
 
By the end of 2006 the number of civilians killed in Iraq had nearly doubled, 
from 15, 491 in 2005 to 28, 255 in 2006, the vast majority after the Al-Askari 
bombing with an additional 1.2 million Iraqis being forced to flee their homes62.  At 
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this point the violence had begun to shift from neighbor on neighbor to that of 
neighborhood on neighborhood.  This would prove vital to the success of the Surge in 
2007 because the Americans could stem sectarian violence by isolating 
neighborhoods. 
The Americans now found themselves surrounded by an orgy of violence and 
faced with a number of missions and stretched thin by having to stand up and train 
Iraqi forces while simultaneously fighting the Sunni insurgents, the Shi’a militias, and 
also having to try and keep both sides from attacking each other’s civilians.  All the 
while they faced rhetoric from higher up that things are improving, that implementing 
rule-of-law is not the job of the American military and expecting orders to further 
consolidate bases in preparation for a large-scale draw down63.  Despite herculean 
efforts to quell the violence, Americans found themselves increasingly on the 
sidelines of an all out Iraqi civil war while also fighting a vicious insurgency. 
In a last ditch effort to stop the violence and defeat the insurgency the 
Americans moved 3,700 reinforcements from Mosul to Baghdad and planned two 
large operations supported by the Iraqi Army to “clear, hold, build” neighborhoods of 
Baghdad.  In this strategy the Americans would first enter a neighborhood then depart 
leaving the Iraqis to “hold” it and provide security for a “build” phase64.   The 
assumption was that a long American presence would have an “anti-body” like effect 
that provoked further attacks and catalyzed the violence65. 
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Operations Together Forward I and II lasted from late June to late August, and 
the Americans proved very capable of killing insurgents, but the Iraqi military was 
still too inept to take a leading role66.  The porous and chaotic layout of Baghdad 
enabled the insurgents to leave a neighborhood that was being cleared and rarely 
confront the overwhelming firepower of the Americans, instead leaving IEDs and 
snipers to inflict casualties and disrupt operations.  When the Americans left the 
Iraqis to “hold”, insurgents would re-infiltrate and counter-attack; the Iraqis that were 
not killed or deserted found themselves unable to retain control of the area67.  By the 
end of the summer the failure of Operations Together Forward I and II to quell the 
violence was apparent.  Ultimately the lessons of Together Forward I and II were the 
nail in the coffin that proved the inability of the American and Iraqi militaries to stop 
the violence in Baghdad using a conventional approach.  Instead of quelling the 
violence, it actually increased by more than 43 percent between the summer and 
October 200668.   
Anbar Is Lost 
The homogenous population of the Western province of Anbar meant that the 
entire population was mobilized in support of the insurgency, which was further 
strengthened by the maturation of the radical Islamic movement.  After the American 
invasion fundamentalist insurgent fighters had begun to trickle in from Jordan and 
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Syria bringing warm bodies and external funding.69  In October 2004, while faced 
with an expected large-scale American assault Abu Musab al-Zarqawi declared his 
radical Islamic organization Al Qaeda in Iraq so as to tap into external resources to 
help his organization rebuild and regroup after the presumably costly battle70.  
Though the fundamentalist foreign-fighters took a role in the defense of the cities, 
most of their operations were the infrequent, but large-scale suicide bombings that 
killed hundreds of civilians.  By 2006 Al Qaeda in Iraq had formed what was 
effectively a second insurgency within Anbar that was separate from the Sunni-Iraqi 
insurgency, with the goal of establishing a fundamentalist Islamic state, manned 
largely by foreign fighters, and funded by the external radical Islamic community71.  
By 2006 the insurgents had de facto control of most of Anbar with many cities 
and towns having areas in to which the Americans did not go because they would 
take heavy casualties and have to abdicate due to lack of the troops and bases 
necessary to maintain a permanent presence leaving the insurgents in complete 
control of these safe-havens72.  The situation was so dire that in August 2006 the top 
Marine intelligence officer in Anbar filed a classified intelligence report (which was 
almost immediately leaked to the press) in which he asserted that: the Americans 
could not project long-term security outside the immediate perimeter of their own 
bases…the Iraqi central government had all but collapsed; that there was an effective 
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military stalemate; and that for all intents and purposes Anbar province was lost to the 
Americans with the insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq in complete control73. 
Effect of American Mid-Term Elections 
By early 2006 the Bush Administration and the Republican Party found 
themselves in an election year with a full-scale war that was undeniably spiraling out 
of control and no end in sight.  For the first time in the Bush Administration many 
members of Congress who had unquestionable toed the party line began to break 
ranks in increasing numbers for their own political survival.  In March 2006 
Representative Frank Wolf, who had consistently voted with the president, broke 
ranks for the first time by attaching a rider to a spending bill that would create the 
Iraq Study Group.74 
The Iraq Study Group was to be a bi-partisan group of well respected, well 
known Americans with a long history of public service taking a look at the Iraq war 
with “a fresh set of eyes so as to provide “outside-the-box” options for a way forward 
in Iraq”75.  The implied intent was to find a way to end the Iraq War without the 
large-scale stigma of a Vietnam-like defeat.  This led to domestic assumptions in 
America and Iraq that the American presence was coming to an end sooner rather 
than later.   
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Things Begin to Shift 
A Different Way in Tal Afar 
 In early 2005 after only 10 months home from their first year-long 
deployment, the American 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment76 was given notice that 
they were being sent back to Iraq77.  During their first tour the unit had been rapidly 
shifted from place to place as commanders requested its heavy firepower and armored 
vehicles as reinforcements in areas where insurgent activity was picking up, then 
have to leave to another area only to have to return weeks or months later to refight 
the same battles in the same places and take ever more casualties78.  This resulted in a 
hardened veteran cadre of leaders within the unit having seen the failure of hard 
power use to defeat the insurgency.  Now the unit was to have one area of 
responsibility in the town of Tal Afar in the far northwest of Iraq and a new 
commander with new ideas.  The commander was Colonel H.R McMaster who had 
received the Silver Star during the First Gulf War; earned a Ph. D from the University 
of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, with a thesis titled “Dereliction of Duty” about how 
during the Vietnam War the failure of senior military commanders in the field to 
challenge the those at the Pentagon directly contributed to the loss of the war79.  
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 By the time the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment was headed back to Iraq it was 
a unit with a core of veterans disillusioned about both the progress of the war and the 
futility in how it was being fought, with a commander with a proven combat record 
and pedigree based on the need to push back against those in the rear and that was 
being sent far from headquarters prying eyes.  This would prove a perfect storm to 
take risks and fight the war a different way.  Ultimately The Battle of Tal Afar would 
prove to be the first successful counterinsurgency campaign of the Iraq War. 
As with much of the country, Tal Afar had been heavily occupied in the days 
following the invasion, but by 2005 only 150 Americans were left in a town of 
80,000.  The town was in complete chaos, with the Sunni and Turkomen minorities 
fighting both each other and the Shia majority that had traditionally ruled while Al 
Qaeda in Iraq was using it as a sanctuary to funnel weapons to Mosul80.  In June 2005 
3,500 Americans along with 1,500 Iraqi Soldiers began to arrive at a base outside of 
Tal Afar in preparation for the coming battle.  Instead of immediately waging a 
Fallujah-style attack, the Americans began to build enormous sand berms around the 
city and construct checkpoints on the roads in and out of the city81 in order to stop the 
insurgents from freely moving in and out of the city.  At the same time the American 
leadership met with local leaders to build relationships and begin splitting them from 
the insurgency82.  Colonel McMaster made it clear that he knew many of the leaders 
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had ties to the insurgency, but that the past was the past and his troops were not going 
to attack or detain anyone who was not actively attacking the military, the Iraqi 
government or the civilian populace.   
By September the Americans had completely sealed off the city and began to 
push into the city’s neighborhoods and establish a series of combat outposts83 deep 
within the Iraqi neighborhoods and to project a permanent presence and force the 
insurgents into a battle.  Once a combat outpost had been established they would 
patrol and stress protecting the population and reestablishing rule of law and putting 
pressure on the insurgents.  To appease the locals the Americans would co-locate 
themselves with Iraqi Soldiers so as to put a local face on the operations.  The 
Americans also tried different tactics.  Instead of knocking down doors in violent 
raids they would knock on the door before searching them then pay for any damage 
caused.  This helped mitigate any anger that the raid had caused84.  By the end of 
September there were 29 combat outposts in Tal Afar meaning that the Americans 
were now a de facto part of the local dynamic and were now a force to be reckoned 
with85. In the short term violence went up as the Americans moved into insurgent 
strong holds and the insurgents found themselves unable to escape.  It was just a 
matter of time before the Americans closed in, to they chose to stand and fight.  As 
the Americans used hard power to detain and kill the insurgents within the now 
segregated city, the population found that with the reestablishment of the rule of law, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 combat outposts are a type of small Spartan base with between 50-200 troops rotating out giving the 
military the ability to have a small number of troops in a large number of areas. 
 
84 Packer.  “Lessons from Tal Afar.” 
 
85 McCone, et. al.  “The 3rd ACR in Tal’Afar,” 16. 
	  -­‐39-­‐	  
and supporting the Americans was in their best interests as opposed to the insurgents 
who seemed to be dedicated to maintaining the sectarian violence86.  As security 
improved the Americans worked with local leaders to bring in reconstruction projects 
that raised the standard of living and drained support from the insurgency as markets 
reopened and basic services returned to normal. 
These unconventional uses of hard power and force to draw out the insurgents 
while also focusing on using soft power to break the civilians from the insurgents and 
build support for the presence of the Americans would prove the first use of Smart 
Power.  Smart Power is a carrot and stick approach using hard power’s firepower and 
direct attacks while also focusing on reconstruction and engagement of the local 
population so that they drop support for the insurgency.  When Colonel McMaster’s 
unit left in February 2006 the number of attacks had dropped from 170 per month to 
less than 2087 and effectively destroyed Tal Afar as an insurgent safe have.  Though 
the smart power approach was successful in Tal Afar, the city had only 170,000 
inhabitants and was only 28 square kilometers.  It was unclear if the smart power 
approach could be replicated (elsewhere) in the larger cities with a much more robust 
and entrenched insurgent support network. 
The Battle of Ramadi 
 In February 2006 Colonel Sean MacFarland’s First Brigade First 
Armored Division briefly replaced Colonel McMaster’s regiment, but was almost 
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immediately sent south to Ramadi88.  Ramadi is the capital of Anbar province that sits 
on the main highway between Baghdad and the Jordanian/Syrian borders and was a 
major insurgent supply route.  By early 2006 the Americans had all but abandoned 
large swaths of the city, not setting foot in many neighborhoods for months.  This left 
an insurgent stronghold where Al Qaeda in Iraq was free to establish a headquarters 
and implement Sharia law.  The insurgents even controlled the hospital, openly 
treating their own and killing patients they deemed un-loyal. 
Colonel MacFarland’s orders were simple “Fix Ramadi.  But don’t destroy it.  
Don’t pull a Fallujah89”.  Taking into account the success of Smart power use in Tal 
Afar90 and realizing that the last three units in Ramadi had lost roughly 100 soldiers 
and his unit would as well, MacFarland decided to gamble that the results of Tal Afar 
could be replicated in the larger city with a much more intense, entrenched 
insurgency and that simply patrolling from the large bases was bound to fail and 
waste his troops lives91.   
Due to the sheer size of a city like Ramadi, building a Tal Afar-like berm was 
deemed unfeasible.  Instead the Americans quietly began to drop large concrete 
barriers on many of the roads in and out of the city while expanding and fortifying 
checkpoints on the remaining roads in expectation of an increase of traffic and 
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attacks92.  These barriers could not prevent insurgents smuggling weapons in on foot, 
but they could stop heavy weapons and car-bombs.  In late June the Americans began 
push their into the city by focusing on isolating individual neighborhoods with the 
concrete barriers and then building combat outposts93.  Throughout the summer the 
Americans methodically advanced neighborhood by neighborhood reestablishing 
their presence and control deeper and deeper into the city.  
The Insurgency in Anbar 
 The insurgency in Anbar province was actually two individual 
insurgencies with separate members, goals and motivation.  The first insurgency was 
the tribal insurgency made up of Sunni Iraqis who saw the Americans as occupiers 
reeking of colonization and the Iraqi government as an American puppet.  These 
tribes were principally organized along historical family relationships and numbered 
from tens to thousands (and fit into the macro-tribal structure of the broader Levant 
that with macro-tribes numbering well into the millions9495) having existed in Anbar 
for hundreds if not thousands of years with some tribes even predating Islam96.  In an 
area of the world where governments come and go, the tribe was forever and 
provided structure during time of what would otherwise be chaos.  Saddam had tried 	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to suppress the tribes prior to 1991, but was unsuccessful in doing so.  After the First 
Gulf War weakened Saddam, the tribes began to quietly rise up against the Baathist 
regime and were brutally suppressed.  But as sanctions increasingly weakened 
Saddam’s rule during the 1990s he began to pay the tribes so as to stabilize his rule 
over Anbar and even allowed them to acquire weapons with the expectation that they 
would defend Anbar the event of an American or Iranian invasion freeing up troops 
for use elsewhere97.  After the Americans invaded the tribes liberated many of the 
rural areas and small towns of Anbar expectation of working with the Americans as 
partners.  But such a partnership clashed with the American image of Iraq as a secular 
liberal democracy98. 
The radical Islamists united under umbrella of Al Qaeda in Iraq were the other 
major insurgency within Anbar.  These were the young radicalized Muslims who 
came to Iraq to fight the infidel Americans with the goal of creating a new Caliphate99 
based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law56.  The external radical pan-Islamic 
community funded Al Qaeda in Iraq.  It largely stayed out of the minor day-to-day 
attacks on the Americans, instead carrying out the spectacular suicide attacks against 
the Americans, the Iraqi government, and the Shia, whom they viewed as apostates 
deserving of death hoping to start a civil war in which they could be exterminated100.   
As the war went on the tribes found themselves weakened by fighting the 
Americans, hurt financially by the stop the fighting put on the local economy, and 	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lacking strong leadership because leaders of the more powerful tribes fled to the 
safety and confront of other Arab states101.  As the tribes grew weaker the externally 
funded Al Qaeda in Iraq grew stronger and expanded its position102.  By mid-2006 Al 
Qaeda in Iraq had further weakened the tribes by taking over the most lucrative 
smuggling routes and setting up checkpoints on the roads as forms of unofficial 
taxation (traditional sources of tribal revenue)103.  The foreign fighters also began to 
force local women to marry them, going against the tradition of cousin marriage to 
retain wealth within the tribe104.  When the American presence and influence 
vanished in wide swaths of Ramadi, Al Qaeda in Iraq began to forcefully institute 
Sharia-law; things such as smoking, drinking and television were banned on pain of 
death in a society where these had been widespread and in a culture that had never 
seen such a version of Islam105.  To make matters worse the insurgents began a 
campaign of intimidation that was bloody even by Anbar’s standards.  The worst was 
in August, when Al Qaeda in Iraq assassinated a sheik and hid his body for three days 
contrary to Islamic tradition106.  It was becoming increasingly clear to the tribes that 
Al Qaeda in Iraq planned on maintaining a long-term presence in Iraq at the same 
time that the American domestic debate was making it clear that they were intent on 
leaving. 	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 The end result of all of this was that the tribes were now seething with anger 
at the Al Qaeda in Iraq.  Not only were they foreign, but they were now operating 
outside the rules of the game that had governed Anbar for millennia and clearly did 
not plan on being partners with the tribes and forcing a new way of life on traditional 
Iraqi culture.  As the American advanced into Ramadi during the summer of 2006 
they increasingly found dead foreign fighters with anti-Al Qaeda in Iraq slogans that 
were signs of a beginning blood feud by the tribes against Al Qaeda.  The American 
Outposts and permanent presence meant that they were increasingly taking a pseudo-
tribal role and could work within traditional politics against Al Qaeda in Iraq.   
Anbar Awakes 
In early September a group of 25 Sheiks from rural areas outlying Ramadi led 
by Sheik Sattar Abu Risha approached the Americans about a possible alliance 
against the insurgents.  Colonel MacFarland immediately agreed to quietly meet with 
tribal leaders to begin negotiations107.  On September 9, 2006 Sheik Satter and his 
allies announced the beginning of the Anbar Awakening, any sheik looking to break 
with Al Qaeda in Iraq could join the Anbar Salvation Council and receive financial 
and military support regardless of any past actions108.  
The most immediate problem for the Americans was how to legitimize the 
newly aligned tribal fighters.  Large scale incorporation into the Iraqi Security Forces  
would face logistical problems and political obstinacy from the Shi’a controlled 
government in Baghdad (that would not be eager to see a large increase in the Sunni 	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demographic of the Iraqi Security Forces).  The interim solution was to create the 
Sons of Anbar (later Sons of Iraq), which was a group of “concerned local citizens” 
committed to protecting their communities.  The Sons of Anbar were to be paid and 
armed by the Americans until such a time that they could be incorporated into the 
Iraqi Security Forces109110.   These forces were ad hoc and hated by the Iraqi 
government in Baghdad who accused MacFarland of simply paying off and arming 
the insurgents so that they would stop attacking the Americans who could then 
withdraw.  At first MacFarland was unable to even get logistical support from his 
own higher headquarters and found his unit arming the Sons of Iraq with weapons 
that had been captured from the insurgents111. 
The Anbar Awakening was a massive gamble by both sides.  The sheiks knew 
that their tribes were now direct targets of the Al Qaeda in Iraq  (Satter was actually 
assassinated by a car-bomb in 2007112) and if the Awakening failed to unite the tribes 
or the Americans left prematurely and Al Qaeda in Iraq was not defeated, the tribes 
would face massive retaliatory attacks causing heavy casualties and drastic 
weakening    The Awakening was also the product of a single American brigade 
commander.  There was a very real possibility of the tribes finding themselves 
abandoned if MacFarland’s higher ups, who had not been consulted, ordered him to 
stop working with former insurgents, or if his replacement the next year did not buy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Greg Bruno.  “Finding a Place for the ‘Sons of Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 9, 
2009, accessed January 17, 2012. 
 
110 Jim Michaels.  A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq’s Deadliest City and Turned 
the Tide of War.  (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2010) 174. 
 
111Ricks.  The Gamble  67.  
 
112 Alissa J. Rubin.  “Sunni Sheik Who Backed US in Iraq is Killed,” New York Times, September 14, 
2007, accessed on January 10, 2012. 
	  -­‐46-­‐	  
into his radical strategy. The Americans risked creating, arming and strengthening 
former insurgents that had been attacking them literally just weeks before and could 
turn against them as quickly as they had turned against the insurgents.  
The fall and winter of 2006 continued to be a hard and bloody fight for the 
Americans and Sons of Anbar as both sides worked to prove their fealty to the 
alliance in the face of Al Qaeda in Iraq attacks.  As the Americans advanced and 
expanded their presence in Ramadi, they proved to the tribes to be a much more 
benign presence than Al Qaeda in Iraq and a powerful ally113.  A watershed moment 
came on November 25, 2006 when the Abu Soda tribe declared neutrality and that Al 
Qaeda in Iraq was not longer going to be allowed to smuggle weapons and car bombs 
through their territory.  In retaliation Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters waged an all out 
attack.  Within hours they had killed many of the tribe members and burned houses 
while the surviving members found themselves holed up in one remaining compound.  
In desperation one of its members swam across a canal and rushed to a nearby farm to 
call a local American battalion commander’s interpreter114.  When the Americans 
received the call they quickly dispatched aircraft to the area to slow the insurgent 
advance, at one point having the tribesmen wave towels above their heads to signify 
who was who.  While back at the base troops about to go on a mission were 
redirected to relieve the Abu Sodas and within hours the Americans had arrived, 
driving off Al Qaeda in Iraq and begging construction of a combat outpost to protect 
against future attacks.  All of this was done without approval of MacFarland because 
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he was in Baghdad and unavailable, but upon his return he praised the initiative of his 
staff and subordinate commanders115.  This is a sign of how those on the ground had 
embraced the new tactics and were seeing their success on the ground first hand.  In 
just two days the Americans had gone from having an area that was hostile and a 
major supply route for the insurgency to one that was now solidly on their side116. 
The American support of the Abu Soda tribe proved to be a watershed 
moment by providing proof of their promise to support any tribe willing to turn 
against Al Qaeda in Iraq.  In the aftermath, the Awakening was to spread like wildfire 
through the province.  In January 2007 MacFarlands’s battered brigade left Anbar to 
redeploy back to the United States; the unit’s accomplishments were many.  In just 
six months they had: established an American presence in virtually all of the areas 
surrounding Ramadi and 70% of the city proper by construction of 18 combat 
outposts117, negotiated a tribal alliance that firmly broke the local population from the 
insurgency, but most importantly illustrated that new bold tactics were capable of 
defeating the insurgency118.  All of these accomplishments set the stage for 
MacFarland’s replacements to wage one last major offensive and decisively defeat Al 
Qaeda in Iraq.  By the summer, attacks had plunged from an average of 20 per day in 
January to only one or two a week in May and by August 2007 the city had gone 
more than 80 days without an attack. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
115 Bill Roggio.  “Anbar: The Abu Soda Tribe vs. Al Qaeda,” The Long War Journal, November 26, 
2006, accessed January 7, 2011. 
 
116 Michaels.  A Chance in Hell. 98. 
 
117 Jim Michaels.  “An Army Colonel’s Gamble Pays Off in Iraq,” USA Today, May 1, 2007.  
 
118 Michaels, A Chance in Hell,  198. 
	  -­‐48-­‐	  
 
The “Petraeus Doctrine” 
In late 2005 General Petraeus returned from his tour of duty overseeing the 
training of the Iraqi Security Forces.  At the time it appeared he had largely failed to 
make any progress.  In hindsight it would become apparent that progress was being 
made because small units were gaining competency; it was just a bottom-up process 
because the smaller units that made up the larger ones had to become competent 
before the higher and more complex levels of command could be established119.   
Petraeus’s next command was to be the Army Combined Arms Center in Fort 
Levenworth, a command with numerous subordinate units, but most importantly 
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.  While many of his peers stayed in combat 
commands and continued to lead troops in the field, he was being sent out to pasture 
as far from the war as he could be120.  Not content to sit on the sidelines, in late 2005 
Petraeus announced at a luncheon that he was going to revise American counter-
insurgency doctrine by writing a new Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field 
manual121122.   
What would eventually be called the Petraeus Doctrine emphasized the 
emerging idea of Smart Power as the basis for waging counterinsurgency by 
synthesizing the use of precision hard power’s force and coercion with that of soft 	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power’s engagement and co-option to take a new approach. The Petraeus Doctrine 
emphasized that while soldiers should never hesitate to use force they needed to be 
cognizant that killing a minor foot-soldier and collateral damage could actually 
strengthen the insurgency and firmly turn the locals against the Americans.  Petraeus 
added a large degree of Soft Power to the new doctrine by having a new focus 
building support for the Americans within the local civilian community.  A civilian 
community supportive of the Americans would facilitate defeating the insurgents 
because they would be denied sanctuary and logistical support123.  In order to protect 
the population the Americans needed to move into civilian communities to provide 
round-the-clock security; gain familiarity with the local dynamic as well as meet, 
negotiate and partner with local leaders against the insurgency. The Petraeus Doctrine 
stressed cultural relativism and that the Americans should not make assumptions as to 
what was good or bad, right or wrong.  This asserted the importance of not assuming 
an attitude of cultural superiority and trying to force change on the locals, instead 
working within traditional local customs to build alliances and support.  An 
unprecedented level of cultural awareness training soon began; Iraq refugees were 
hired as actors to portray civilians during combat training and experts were hired to 
brief deploying troops.  This was manifested in Iraq by acknowledging the 
importance of the tribes and working with them and the government to defeat the 
insurgency.  Finally the Petraeus Doctrine stressed the importance of reconciling with 
former enemies despite past transgressions (especially with those who had killed 
Americans).  This was also manifested in Iraq by quietly doing away with de-
Baathification and putting pressure on the Iraqi government to follow suit.  This put 	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the new doctrine directly at odds with Bush’s neo-conservative image of Iraq as a 
Western-style democracy run by those who had never been a Baathist or involved 
with the insurgency124.  Thus the shift to Smart Power was also a shift from the 
idealism that had caused so many of the blunders of the early war to a doctrine firmly 
rooted in Realpolitik. 
By early 2006 Petraeus and his team had compiled a rough draft of the field 
manual and decided to host a large conference of more than 150 experts, ranging 
from anthropologists to human rights experts to military and civilian intelligence 
analysts, to conduct comprehensive outside review of it125.  This was a completely 
unorthodox approach to creating doctrine than made the new Field Manual 3-24 
unique and complex.  Ironically enough the conference on how to change the way in 
which the Iraq War was being fought began on the same day as the Al-Askari mosque 
bombing that kicked off the full-blown civil war.  The Manual itself would be 
available to troops in the field in unofficial form in June 2006 with the final 
publication as official Army and Marine Corps doctrine in December126. 
Going All In 
The fall 2006 elections were effectively a referendum on the Republican 
leadership and ended in a massive defeat for the Republican Party losing the majority 
in both the Senate and House of Representatives127.  In the wake of the election 
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President Bush announced the resignation of the controversial Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and nominated the former head of CIA and current President of 
Texas A&M University Robert Gates as his replacement.   
With the events of 2006 coming to a close President Bush faced an incoming 
Congress hostile to his Iraq policies on both sides of the aisle that forced him to either 
change course in Iraq or risk Congress ending the war through use of the purse 
strings.  In December 2006 the Iraq Study Group published their assessment that the 
situation in Iraq had completely deteriorated and was getting worse.  With 
recommendations of how to change the course in Iraq by the Iraq Study Group, policy 
think tanks (such as the Rand Corporation and American Enterprise Institute) and 
lobbying by retired Generals, President Bush was faced with 4 possible courses of 
action: shift focus from the counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism by holing up in 
fortified bases and strictly attacking terrorists who could threaten the United States 
directly, such as Al Qaeda in Iraq; shift focus to counter-terrorism and training the 
Iraqi Security Forces in the hopes that they could eventually defeat the insurgency; or 
send in reinforcements for a last counter-offensive using the Petraeus Doctrine.128  
On January 11, 2007 President Bush announced during a prime-time speech 
that he was sending 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq to wage a counter-
offensive to quell the insurgency and stop the violence in Baghdad in hopes that if the 
center were stabilized security would radiate outwards to the rest of the country.  At 
the same time President Bush warned of a tough battle and that casualties would 
increase as the Americans went back into the neighborhoods, but that ultimately it 
would be worth it to prevent an American defeat and a collapse of the greater Middle 	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East129.  In the days ahead the form of the Surge would be devised and a new 
Secretary of Defense (Robert Gates) and a new commander on the ground (General 
Petraeus) using a new tactics (the Petraeus Doctrine) would attempt one last gamble 
to stop sectarian fighting and defeat the insurgency.   
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Chapter 3: 2007- All In 
 
Too Little, Too Late? 
Once the Surge had been announced change came at a brisk pace.  Within 
days Petraeus had gathered the support staff that would assist him in carrying out the 
Surge, perform ongoing analysis, and serve as a sounding board for how to better tune 
the Surge once it began.  Of particular note is that General Odierno, whose unit had 
seen the most extreme use of hard power, was the commander of Multi-National 
Corps-Iraq and going to be responsible for carrying out the tactical side of the Surge 
on the ground.  He can be seen as representative of how the Army and Marine Corps 
had seen the failure of hard power and were now ready to try a fundamentally new 
approach.  The rest of the staff was an eclectic mixture of counter-insurgency experts, 
Rhodes Scholars, and veteran combat leaders who had graduated at the top of their 
West Point classes130, most having earned Ph. Ds while on sabbatical from the Army 
and probably the most educated group to ever advise a general in the field.  When 
Petraeus and his staff began to tour Baghdad they were shocked as to how badly the 
situation had deteriorated, with once thriving neighborhoods now virtual ghost towns, 
streets empty and shops shuttered because people were afraid to make even the 
smallest trips from home for fear of being one of the two to three thousand civilians 
dying every month131.  The situation was so dire that Petraeus and his staff did not 
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expect to succeed; most on his team gave their chances of success at 10-15% and 
even the optimists 40 percent132.  
Petraeus understood that time was not on his side; the Americans lacked the 
political will, military ability and domestic support to sustain the Surge for long.  In 
early September General Petraeus was scheduled to testify in front of Congress as to 
progress of the Surge.  If he was unable to report that the violence had peaked and the 
Iraqis were increasingly taking a leading role in the fight, he would almost certainly 
be ordered to initiate a withdrawal of American military forces to Kuwait133.   
During the Surge half of the active Army and one third of the Marine Corps 
would be deployed, intensely training to deploy or recovering from a deployment.  
The Surge marked the beginning of the third 12-18 month deployment for many 
Army units that marched to Baghdad in 2003, while the Marines had been deploying 
for seven months, home for five to eight and then sent back.  This created a situation 
in which many individual soldiers and Marines found themselves having spent more 
time in Iraq than at home in the previous years, and they would continue to do so until 
grievously wounded or killed134. Divorce rates skyrocketed and retention rates 
plummeted as the best and brightest left for a bustling civilian economy.  An 
indication of this is how the Army and Marine Corps re-enlistment budget went from 
$174 million in 2003 to more than $1 billion in 2007135.  Those that remained faced 
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skyrocketing rates of PTSD and Traumatic Brain Injuries, which helped drive the 
suicide rate up more than 80 percent136.  At the same time standards for those coming 
into the military plummeted, an example is how the number of recruits with high 
school diplomas dropped from 94 percent in 2003 to 70.1 percent in 2007 while those 
requiring criminal background and medical waivers had more than tripled137. The 
Surge would push a weary, bloodied force facing declining standards nearly to the 
breaking point (if it was not already there).  Numerically it would be unfeasible to 
replace the Surge units without damaging the ability of the American military to 
project ground combatant force elsewhere in the world (especially Iran and North 
Korea) while the war in Afghanistan was beginning to heat up138.  The end result was 
that even if the Americans had the will to replace the Surge troops, they did not have 
the ability to do so. 
The Strategy 
In preparation for the coming counter-offensive Petraeus’s Chief of Staff 
Major General Fastabend’s139 wrote a 20 page long essay “Tell Me How This Ends: 
It’s Fourth and Long, Go Deep”; wherein he called for six radical departure points 
from how the Americans had been waging war and proved a Smart Power based 	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blueprint in all but name.  By outlining and analyzing these points can be used as a 
framework for best understanding the overall strategy of the Surge.   
Fastabend’s first point was to work with former insurgents whenever possible 
and to kill or capture those who refused to be brought into the fold.  Shi’a militias that 
agreed to stop supporting the insurgency and stop attacking other Iraqis would be 
reframed as neighborhood watches140 that were partners in securing their 
neighborhoods.  The Americans would try to convince the Sunnis to break with Al 
Qaeda in Iraq, whom the Shi’a perceived as the ones who had been attacking their 
neighborhoods, in return for security and reconstruction141.  General Fastabend even 
went so far as suggesting that troops parole low level Iraqis they detained to their 
Sheik on his word that they would not commit further transgressions.  In this way the 
Americans worked within the framework of Iraqi culture by taking advantage of 
traditions of honor to neutralize these low level insurgents without making more 
enemies.  General Fastabend even proposed to take it a step further and have large-
scale detainee releases, but General Petraeus turned this down as too radical142. 
The next step was to reassert the American attitude toward the Iraqi 
government.  Since the American handover of sovereignty in 2004 the Americans had 
treated the Iraqi government as an equal and tended to stay out of Iraqi government 
affairs and had to keep it appeased, especially Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki, even 
as it was increasingly become a tool of the radicalized Shi’a.  Fastabend called for the 
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Americans to abandon this policy of appeasement, instead to pressure the Iraqi 
government even to the point of angering Maliki143.  If the Surge was to succeed the 
Americans would have to ensure that the Sunnis would be allowed to form and 
participate in neighborhood watches, even though the Shi’a government was not keen 
on training, arming, and organizing former Sunni insurgents.  If the Americans failed 
to do so it would ensure continued Sunni violence because they would turn to the 
insurgency for protection from the Shi’a militias that had infiltrated the local security 
forces and were ethnically cleansing Baghdad.  But most importantly the Americans 
had to stop the systematic use of Iraqi government institutions harm the Sunnis by the 
Shi’a, such as when the finance ministry closed banks in some Sunni neighborhoods 
and they were forced too keep large amounts of cash at home where it was 
susceptible to the militias because it was too dangerous to trek across the city144. The 
Americans needed to use their role of the more equal partner in the U.S.-Iraq 
relationship to push the Iraqi government to act impartially against their own citizens 
if it was to have any degree of legitimacy. 
General Fastabend also realized that Sunni-Shi’a reconciliation had been tried 
and spectacularly failed at the national level and there was little hope of revival.  
Instead it should be tried anew at the local level.  This had a chance of success 
because the Sunni and Shi’a have a long history of peaceful coexistence.  Before the 
American invasion, Baghdad had been a predominantly mixed city with centuries of 
intermarriage and peaceful cooperation.  Unlike other sectarian conflicts Sunni-Shi’a 
differences had historically been overshadowed by traditional Persian threat against 	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the Arabs.  Prior to the war a person living in Baghdad would have said I am an Arab 
before I am Sunni/Shi’a before I am Iraqi145.  In the wake of the invasion the 
Americans assumed that these divisions were much deeper than they were and 
blatantly favored the Shi’a majority (especially because they did not strongly resist 
the Americans in the way the Sunni tribes had) creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
This situation was further worsened by Iran training, funding and encouraging the 
growth of hardline militias that they had created to oppose Saddam’s forces during 
the Iran-Iraq War146.  As the War got worse and the Americans were unable to 
provide security support, locals were forced to turn to these militias for it.  By 
encouraging local reconciliation the Americans would be bypassing the hardline 
leaders and pandering to the large, moderate populations that remembered that less 
than five years earlier they had members of the opposing sect as friends, whereas in 
the current climate to make opposing friends was to risk summary execution by 
radicals147. 
The next area that General Fastabend addressed was how the economic aid 
was being used.  Up to this point the mindset behind the aid was that it was to be 
spent on large expensive reconstruction projects aimed at rebuilding shattered 
infrastructure and once the standard of living had rebounded civilian support for the 
insurgency would collapse.  These projects were contracted to large western firms 
with non-Iraqi employees, meaning that most of the money spent did not stay within 
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the community148.  These projects proved to be a major target for the insurgents to 
attack and required a large footprint, especially by the private security contractors that 
Iraqis so despised.  The new way of thinking was that aid was to be used for local 
economic development needed to focus on creating jobs for the Iraqis first and 
physical projects second.  By offering the locals jobs they would have an alternative 
to the insurgency for economic survival.  The end result would be economics that 
pushed security instead of physical reconstruction. 
The fifth point that General Fastabend made was that there were no fast 
answers.  Though time was tight the Americans would have to avoid temptations to 
wage a hasty campaign, instead acting with steady prudence.  The Americans would 
use the nine traditional administrative districts149 as a template for security zones, and 
they would focus on securing one zone before moving on to another, starting with the 
ones where the insurgency was less well-entrenched.  The decision was made 
specifically not to move into Sadr City because the Americans did not want a large-
scale confrontation with Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi, which tightly controlled 
the area.  The other reason was due to Sadr’s political power within the Iraqi 
government, it was unclear if it could survive a boycott or withdrawal by all of Sadr’s 
supporters150.  Fastabend also emphasized that once the Americans went into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Ricks, The Gamble, 30. 
 
149 Prior to the American invasion these were strictly used as administrative centers for the delivery of 
municipal services to Baghdad’s 89 neighborhoods.  After the American invasion they were used as a 
means of electing the Baghdad City Council. 
 
150 Ricks, The Gamble, 158. 
	  -­‐60-­‐	  
security zones they had to remain until the Iraqi Security Forces were truly ready and 
capable to retain control and provide non-sectarian rule of law151.   
The final point that Fastabend advocated was a timetable for withdrawal.  A 
timetable for withdrawal would build the image of the Surge wherein the Americans 
would ally with the Iraq Security Forces to temporarily move into virtually every 
facet of Iraqi life as temporary assistance to defeat the insurgency.  This was 
especially key to keeping the Surge from having an image of just an intensification of 
the occupation.  While the Americans disagreed with Iraqi calls for a quick 
withdrawal in another misunderstanding they differed on what exactly “quick” meant.  
When Al-Sadr was asked what he viewed as a quick withdrawal he replied that he 
would like to see the Surge forces gone by 2012152.  When the American commanders 
heard this they viewed it as almost comical because they would be lucky to have the 
extra forces for a year.  Yet at the same time a timetable risked giving the insurgents 
the impression that they could simply wait out the Surge.  The end result was a 
compromise whereby the Sadrists were promised that the Americans would not 
withdraw, but substantially lower their forces and negotiate a timetable for a full 
withdrawal in 2008153. 
The Americans 
 Almost immediately after the announcement of the Surge the American 
military began to deploy twenty-thousand troops comprising five brigades and their 
support elements while most of the troops in Iraq had their tours extended.  This 	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would give General Petraeus twenty brigade-size forces (plus assorted foreign forces) 
in country.  Even with the additional reinforcements Petraeus would not have nearly 
the 1 soldier for every 20 inhabitants.  Even by focusing the reinforcements into 
Baghdad and Baghdad Belts154 there would only be roughly ninety-one thousand 
when his doctrine would call for roughly one hundred twenty thousand. Six brigades 
were slated to go directly into the city to fight the insurgents in Baghdad with the 
others to the Belts155.  The Baghdad Belts are the less densely populated suburban, 
agricultural and industrial areas that surround the city, which proved to be safe-
havens for the insurgents to take a break from fighting in Baghdad to regroup and 
refit while also providing logistical support for those fighting in the City. 
The Iraqis 
 The Iraqi Army of 2007 was a drastic improvement.  In the and was a product 
of the methodical, long-term bottom up training program that the Americans had 
instituted in the wake of the disasters of 2004.  The number of Iraqi Security Forces 
by the beginning of the Surge had grown twenty percent since the year before and 
would continue to grow another twenty five percent by the end of the Surge156.  For 
the first time since the American invasion the Iraqi Army157 was capable of 
operations at the brigade and division level, though they were still at the “led” phase 
of the “led, lead, leave” training mantra and reliant on the Americans for logistical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154Department of the Army.  FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency.  Washington: 2006.   
 
155“Baghdad Belts,” Institute For the Study of War, accessed on March 20, 2012 
 
156 DJ Elliott, “The Real Surge,” The Long War Journal, November 23, 2007, accessed on March 19, 
2012.  
 
157 The Iraqis consider the pre and post-invasion Armies to be one in the same, with most divisions 
tracing their lineage back to the Kingdom of Iraq in the 1940s. 
	  -­‐62-­‐	  
and leadership support, but would prove a major asset for the Americans, especially 
in retaining control of the cities after the Americans did the heavy lifting of defeating 
the insurgency. 
 In Baghdad the Shi’a militias had heavily infiltrated the Iraqi and were 
complicit in allowing, if not perpetuating, attacks against the civilian population158.  
The new General in charge of the training of the Iraqi Security Forces decided on a 
radical course of action to acknowledge the militia’s infiltration purged the Iraqi 
Police of compromised members weakening militia influence at the expense of 
having fewer, but more loyal Police159.  Commanders now felt less compelled to act 
in the sectarian interests of the militias, raising public opinion of the legitimacy of the 
Iraqi Police and resulting in what was a strengthened, less sectarian, and more loyal 
Iraqi Police Force160. 
Opening Moves 
 On February 10, 2007 General Petraeus officially took command of all 
American forces in Iraq and only three days later paratroopers of the Army’s 82nd 
Airborne Division loaded up in their armored vehicles and left their big base in 
Baghdad to push into the Sunni neighborhood of Doura, officially marking the 
beginning of Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (Imposing Order) and the Surge161.  As the 
spring and early summer wore on the Americans advanced into neighborhood after 
neighborhood and as predicted it was a grueling bitter slog with fierce insurgent 	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resistance.  Soon a predictable cycle began to assert itself.  In the dark of night the 
Americans would send in snipers to watch over an intended combat outpost, then 
Combat Engineers would clear a route of IEDs for a column of American vehicles to 
move into their new base and begin fortifying it.  Once a combat outpost had been 
built, the Americans would isolate the neighborhood by emplacing eight-foot 
concrete barriers (or in one case having engineers weaken a bridge so it could only 
accommodate foot traffic) and build heavily fortified checkpoints on the remaining 
points of entry and exit.  When the situation allowed they would establish a census of 
Iraqi civilians in the neighborhood by requiring that they submit to retinal scans and 
fingerprints. The Americans would do the same to those coming through the 
checkpoints into and out of the neighborhood as well as those in proximity to attacks 
(especially IED attacks).  By monitoring the coming and goings of those in the 
neighborhoods the Americans were better able to track those who belonged and those 
who didn’t, as well as those involved in suspicious activities, such as foreigners who 
were near multiple IED attacks. Though the insurgents could still smuggle personal, 
small weapons and ammunition over the concrete barriers, they found it much harder 
to move the homemade explosives, rockets and car-bombs used in large attacks 
against civilians and capable of destroying American bases162. 
 The intensity of the fighting was hard on the Iraqi Army, but they performed 
better than in the past when entire units would go AWOL when they found out they 
were being sent to fight the insurgents.  Unfortunately in some situations the 
insurgents were still able to intimidate Iraqi Army into brokering local ceasefires.  	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Though Iraqi Army units were supposed to have only 25 percent of their unit on leave 
at a time163 many units found themselves missing 40 percent of their troops.  With 
Iraqi Army units rotating in and out of Baghdad every 90 days before being sent back 
to the (safer) areas where they were permanently stationed, many Iraqi commanders 
were more worried about ensuring their units didn’t get too chewed up and bickering 
with each other for the troops coming out of training164.  Yet as the Surge wore on 
and the insurgents were beaten back and security re-established the morale of the 
Iraqi Army went up, desertion rates went down, newer units gained combat 
experience, and ultimately the quality and numbers of the Iraqi Security Forces 
continued to rise.  To combat the issues caused by the rotations, permanent divisions 
were stood in Baghdad and most newly produced battalions were sent there165. 
Insurgent Reactions 
 Insurgent reactions were rapid and fierce.  They understood that Americans 
were now going to be a long term presence and with their new tactics it would just be 
a matter of time before they were identified to be detained (or killed) and their 
weapons caches confiscated, so violence went up in the neighborhoods as the 
insurgents waged all-out attacks to prevent the Americans from establishing a 
footholds in the neighborhoods.  The new combat outposts were usually attacked 
within 24 hours and American actions fiercely resisted until the local insurgents could 
be turned, killed or captured.  These attacks displayed new tactics and weapons; the 
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insurgents began wearing bulletproof armor, suicide car-bombs were heavily armored 
with steel surrounding a that could only be stopped by vehicle mounted heavy 
machine guns or anti-tank rockets.  The insurgents had also had weeks or even 
months to prepare for an eventual American return; Americans advancing into the 
neighborhoods found themselves attacked by insurgents from fortified bunkers and 
hard to detect deeply buried IEDs with enough explosive power to throw a 68 ton 
tank high into the air166.  The insurgents would also deploy snipers against troops 
emplacing the concrete barriers, fortifying their combat outposts and building check 
points.  This necessitated that even cranes be armored, making the work long, 
hazardous and demanding.  
 The insurgents also tried to undermine the partnerships between the Iraqi 
Security Forces and the Americans by intimidating the Iraq Security Forces into 
brokering cease-fires by assassinating their commanders or staging massive 
bombings.  An example is when an Iraqi Army unit was initially pushing into the 
neighborhood of Tarmiyah the insurgents used an IED to blow up their Commander’s 
vehicle in such a massive explosion that his troops were literally unable to put his 
body back together.  In the immediate aftermath the insurgents and the Iraqi Army 
negotiated a cease-fire and the Americans were unable to convince that unit to go on 
joint patrols for the rest of the time it was deployed there167. 
 To compound their attacks and add to the lethality of their car and suicide 
bombers against civilians, the insurgents began adding chlorine, effectively making 
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an improvised weapon of mass destruction.  Though the introduction of the gas did 
not kill large numbers, it did cause large number of injuries (such as respiratory 
problems) to bystanders and first responders. A secondary effect was that authorities 
clamped down on the possession and transportation of chlorine which led directly to 
minor outbreaks of cholera in the north and south168. 
Overall the insurgents fought back against the American with far more 
tenacity than expected.  By late-May the Americans had only been able to reassert 
control over one-third of Baghdad and internal reports said the insurgents had fought 
them to a standstill forcing the Americans to push back their time-table for reasserting 
over the city from July to September169.  This had the immediate effect of further 
weakening support for the Surge in Washington D.C. with members of Congress 
calling for a cessation and immediate withdrawal.  It also created the possibility that 
when General Petraeus reported to Congress in September he would have to report 
failure and begin preparations for a withdrawal. 
Al Askari Again 
 On June 13, 2007 Sunni militants were once again able to sneak into the Al 
Askari mosque, this time destroying two minarets.  The government’s reaction was to 
immediately declare curfews in Samarra and Baghdad, in hopes of keeping the Shi’a 
from retaliating against Sunni civilians as had happened the year before170.  Al Sistani 
called for three days of mourning, a few Sadrists in the government withdrew in 	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protest, but most importantly Muqtada al-Sadr called for restraint and that the Sunnis 
could not be blamed while organizing protests, but not deploying the Jaish al-Mahdi 
to “protect” the mosques as he had the year before171. 
 As civilians, politicians, and soldiers held their breaths to see if the situation 
would further deteriorate they were stunned with sounds of silence with only minor 
retaliatory attacks that quickly petered out.  Sadr’s calls reined in the Jaish al-Mahdi, 
the neighborhood watches refrained from turning on each other, and the Iraqi Security 
Forces maintained security.   
The Sons of Iraq 
 .  Similar to Anbar, Al-Qaeda in Iraq had alienated the local Sunni populations 
through enforcement of radical Islam in culture that had never seen it before172.  The 
Sunnis also began to wonder why those who profess to be such good pious Muslims 
were caring out massive bombings of civilian targets that killed hundreds of ordinary 
Muslims.  In late May and early June the Sons of Anbar movement was began to 
spread from Anbar country into the rest of the country.  The Americans were thrilled 
and renamed it the Sons of Iraq.  This provided a model for creation and 
legitimization of neighborhood watches.  While the local Sunnis saw Sons of Iraq as a 
way to rid themselves of the radicals receiving protection of the Shi’a militias.  This 
largely Sunni organization (though it would eventually incorporate 25 thousand Shi’a 
tired of exploitation by corrupt militias) was intended to man checkpoints and guard 
infrastructure from the Shi’a militias for ten dollars a day.  All a potential recruit had 	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to do was declare allegiance to the government of Iraq and renounce the violence of 
the insurgency.  To insulate it from cooption and corruption by the Shi’a government 
the Sons of Iraq received their funding from local American commanders using their 
Commander’s Emergency Relief Program173174.   
Battle of the Belts 
 By early June the Americans controlled roughly one-third of Baghdad and 
though the going was much slower than the Americans had planned for, the new 
tactics were proving successful and for the first time since the invasion the Americans 
found that once they cleared an area of the insurgency it stayed clear175.  With the 
arrival of the last of the Surge brigades the Americans could finally push into the 
Baghdad Belts and begin to root out the insurgency as it was driven from Baghdad176. 
 On June 16, 2007 the Americans launched Operation Phantom Thunder, 
which was the first in a series of operations in the Belts.  Unlike operations in the city 
the Americans were not able to isolate the more geographically spread out areas, but 
they took other measures to restrict the insurgent’s freedom of movement.  A less 
cluttered airspace meant that it was possible to keep almost constant unmanned drone 
surveillance on the major roads177.  The Americans also took advantage of the water-
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ways to launch attacks as well as to restrict insurgents from crossing the river at will 
and having checkpoints near bridges178. 
 By mid-August the Americans had established Sons of Iraq networks 
throughout the Belts, and forced insurgents fleeing Baghdad to flee further from the 
capital where they were less welcome and less familiar with the local area’s 
geography, politics, and people as well as standing out like a sore thumb from the 
locals.  On August 18, 2007 President Bush summed up ongoing operations in the 
Belts during his weekly radio address: 
In recent months, American and Iraqi forces have struck powerful blows against al 
Qaeda terrorists and violent extremists in Anbar and other provinces. In recent days, our 
troops and Iraqi allies launched a new offensive…we are carrying out targeted operations 
against terrorists and extremists fleeing Baghdad and other key cities -- to prevent them from 
returning or setting up new bases of operation. The terrorists remain dangerous and brutal, as 
we saw this week when they massacred more than 200 innocent Yezidis, a small religious 
minority in northwestern Iraq…and our troops are going to go after the murderers behind this 
horrific attack.179 
 
“Sadr” 
 In the years since the Sadr’s initial formation of the Jaish al-Mahdi it had 
suffering heavy casualties fighting the Americans while also rapidly growing.  This 
meant that much original leadership whose sole goal was to end the American 
occupation and had so effectively fought in 2004 had been diluted.  By 2007 the 
organization of loosely allied miltias had become mafia-like with leaders increasingly 
independent, more focused on personal wealth and power and Jaish al-Mahdi in name 
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only180.  During the sectarian violence Jaish al-Mahdi militias had protected Shi’a 
civilians181 while also spawning the death squads responsible for the ethnic cleansing 
that allowed expansion of its realm of control.  As Sadr lost centralized control many 
of the Jaish al-Mahdi affiliated militias began to extort and exploit the very locals 
they were supposed to protect.  The ethnic cleansing also meant that in the mixed 
neighborhoods where the locals supported the Jaish al-Mahdi out of fear of their 
Sunni neighbors those neighbors were now gone.  To the locals the militia “guards” 
within the neighborhoods increasingly looked like common thugs182.  
 As the Americans advanced into Baghdad the areas that they cleared began to 
recover; jobs were created, markets reopened and the Iraqi standard of living began to 
go back up.  This meant that the neighborhoods surrounding Sadr City began to 
recover from the fighting while Sadr City continued to be a slum where few ventured, 
but it was the population’s own guardians who kept the reconstruction out. 
 On the same day that General Petraeus took command in Baghdad, Muqtada 
al-Sadr left Iraq for Iran to wait out the Surge and see how it played out183.  On May 
25, 2007 Sadr reemerged at a mosque in Kufa to give a sermon wherein he called for 
himself to be an arbitrator of Sunni-Shi’a reconciliation along nationalistic lines, 
forbid the Jaish al-Mahdi from attacking Sunnis and denounced the continued 
American occupation.  This was basically a call to reign in the death squads, which 	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were increasingly unnecessary because they had already served their purpose 
ethnically cleansing most of Baghdad thus cementing the Shi’a powerbase.  He was 
also unsure of the outcome of an American withdrawal in the event that the Surge 
failed. If he did not begin engaging with the Sunni he could very easily find the Jaish 
Al-Mahdi facing: a Sunni bloc united under the Anbar Awakening, the Iraqi 
government and Security Forces, other Shi’a groups with better ties to Iran while also 
under siege from American Special Operations and drones.   
 On the evening of August 27th elements of the Jaish Al-Mahdi got into a battle 
with Badr Organization-affiliated184 Iraqi Security Forces guarding the Imam Ali 
Shrine in Karbala during a Shi’a pilgrimage.  Reprisal fighting continued throughout 
the next day, ending with more than 50 deaths and more than 200 wounded, most of 
them Shi’a civilian pilgrims185.  The entire situation further damaged the image of the 
Jaish al-Mahdi and caused a great loss of face to Sadr himself. 
 The end result of all of these events is that Sadr and the Jaish al-Mahdi began 
to be viewed by ordinary Shi’a as being on the wrong side of history, which 
threatened to undermine Sadr’s political support.  As a result, on August 28th Sadr 
declared a unilateral six-month ceasefire by the Jaish al-Mahdi.  This would allow 
him to consolidate his power to reorganize the Jaish al-Mahdi and get rid of factions 
outside his direct control.  This was actually helped along indirectly by the Americans 
because those he did not control would continue to fight and be killed by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 The Badr Organization was the reincarnation of the Saddam era Badr-brigade which had been 
formed during the Iran-Iraq War.  This organization was less anti-American and a major rival to the 
JAM in the north and south of the country, but not in Baghdad. 
 
185 Charles Crain, “Iraq Militias Fighting for Supremacy,” Time Magazine, August 29, 2007, accessed 
February 16, 2012. 
	  -­‐72-­‐	  
Americans186.  Sadr could also take advantage of a cease-fire by redeploying forces 
from Baghdad to Basra to expand his influence into the power vacuum being created 
by British troops gradually withdrawing from the city to an airport base outside of 
it187. 
“General Petraeus Goes to Washington” 
 Though the heavy fighting continued in Baghdad through the long, hot 
summer of 2007 it had already peaked; the number of attacks against civilians had 
actually peaked in December 2006.  The number of Americans killed in action peaked 
in May 2007 and would decline by more than fifty percent by the time the last of the 
combat outposts was set up in July188.  According to Thomas Ricks, though the 
Americans had faced a hard frustrating bloody slog to move back into Baghdad, by 
late June and early July there was a feeling of cautious optimism and that the 
Americans had accomplished the nearly impossible task of regaining strategic 
initiative189190 from the insurgents.  As the American and Iraqi soldiers moved to 
establish new combat outposts they would travel through neighborhoods where the 
Surge had already proved successful, further raising morale and optimism about the 
success of the Surge. 
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 In this environment General Petraeus was preparing his September report to 
Congress in a cautiously optomistic report191.  After opening pleasantries Petraeus 
begins the report by saying that though his Chain of Command had seen the report, 
the President, Congress, and the Pentagon had not and the report was the uncensored 
reality of what he though had happened on the ground in Baghdad.  He then asserted 
that though the summer had been a brutal fight against tough enemies, “the military 
objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met.192”  Petraeus then went into 
how the violence went up as the Americans directly confronted the insurgency by 
moving into Baghdad, but it had now peaked and was slowly decreasing.  To 
illustrate one way in which the Americans were much more confrontational with the 
insurgents, he points out that by August 2007 his forces had discovered fifty percent 
more arms caches than in all of 2006.  Petraeus then asserted that his forces had 
knocked Al Qaeda in Iraq off balance and taken away their sanctuaries and gained the 
initiative (presumably through killing/capturing its members and denying them 
resupply), but that it was far from defeated and could easily come back given the 
chance193. 
 Petraeus then said that his forces had disrupted Shi’a extremists, especially 
those linked to Hezbollah and Iran194, warning that if the Americans did not continue 
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to keep pressure on there was a risk of these militias evolving into an extremist 
Hezbollah-like state within a state195. 
 He then addressed the issue of the Iraqi Security Forces.  First Petraeus 
reported that there were roughly 140 Iraqi Army battalions196 of which 95 were in the 
“lead” phase of “led, lead, leave”; meaning that they were capable of taking the lead 
in the fighting with the Americans in a support role.  He pointed out that this was a 
major accomplishment, especially because they had improved while also engaged in 
heavy fighting and making major progress toward tenable security.  Petraeus also 
pointed out that the Iraqis were less and less dependent on direct American military 
aid, and that for the second year in a row they had spent more on their military 
equipment than the Americans.  This was also a hint to American military industrial 
complex lobbyists that Iraq had the potential to become a major customer197 and build 
their quiet support for a continued American presence.   
 Petraeus then went on to outline the following recommendations for 
the future of American involvement with Iraq198:  
• military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated momentum;  
• Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow and have slowly been shouldering more of the 
security burden in Iraq;  
• a mission focus on either population security or transition alone will not be adequate to 
achieve our objectives;  
• success against Al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conventional 
forces as well as special operations forces; and  
• the security and local political situations will enable us to draw down the surge forces.  
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In conclusion General Petraeus addressed the future of the American military 
forces in Iraq.  He asserted that by the summer of 2008 American forces would be 
drawn down to pre-Surge levels and that there was potential to draw down even more, 
but he refused to say at what rate or when he envisioned a complete American 
withdrawal.  He also said that the main American mission should not yet be shifted to 
transitioning operations to the Iraqis and counter-terrorism because past experience 
had shown the dangers of prematurely transition mission to the Iraqis and that it could 
lead to a complete unraveling of hard fought gains of the previous months.199 
 Ultimately General Petraeus’s report was a sign of how the last ditch gamble 
that was the Surge had been a success, albiet a brutal, bloody and precarious one.  
Unlike earlier reports to Congress this report was backed by hard data, whose 
collection methodology had been certified by the American intelligence community.  
His underlying message was as much a warning about how it was a success and not a 
victory and that it was still to been seen if the Americans and the Iraqis were able to 
solidify victory. 
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Chapter 4: 2008- An Iraqi War 
The Surge Begins to Wind Down 
 By late November 2007 the violence in Baghdad had continued to fall and the 
Americans wrested control of virtually all of Baghdad, except for Sadr City, with 
refugees beginning to return home and things continuing to improve.  On November 
24, 2012 military officials announced the departure of the first Surge brigades and 
that the last would leave in July 2008200.  Yet even though the Surge was winding 
down the Americans would remain committed to continued combat operations and 
withdrawing from the hard-won Combat Outposts until the insurgency was gone for 
good and Iraqi Security Forces were ready to take control. 
Basra: A Mess, but an Iraqi One 
 While the Americans were Surging in Baghdad, in the southern city of Basra 
the British military had been gradually handing over responsibility for security and 
their bases to the local Iraqi Security Forces in preparation for a complete withdrawal 
from the city201.  These Iraqi Security Forces were largely allied with the Badr 
Organization and unlike the Jaish al-Mahdi the Badr Organization’s militia was 
largely devoted to protecting the Shi’a population and usually refrained from 
attacking the Iraqi government or the Coalition military.  Unfortunately the Iraqi 
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Security Forces were not strong enough to retain control of the city and rival Shi’a 
militias began to move in, especially the Jaish al-Mahdi. 
 On March 21, 2008 Iraqi Prime Minister Nourl al-Maliki met with 
Ambassador Crocker to inform him that on March 24 the Iraqi Army was going to 
unilaterally202 launch a major operation against the militias in Basra.  When 
Operation Saulat al-Fursan (Charge of the Knights) was launched it was unrefined at 
best.  Instead of a slow methodical squeeze that characterized the successful 
operations of 2006 and 2007, it was a Fallujah-like direct assault into the city and 
faced massive resistance.  Almost immediately the Iraqis had to send additional units 
as reinforcements and requested American support, but unlike earlier battles they 
didn’t need large conventional support-only advisors and air support203.  By March 30 
the Jaish al-Mahdi had halted the Iraqi Army advance, but Sadr realized that the 
newly emboldened Iraqi Army would just continue to grow in strength and continued 
resistance would risk the large-scale destruction of his forces (and influence) in the 
south.  Instead he announced a cease-fire whereby his forces would lay down their 
weapons and allow the Iraqi Army to move into the city in return for amnesty for his 
fighters204.  By the end of May the Iraqi Army would have reasserted control over the 
entire city. 
Sadr City  
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 In retaliation for the initial Iraqi Army movements against Basra, on March 23 
the Jaish al-Mahdi in Sadr City began to fire large numbers of rockets and mortars 
into the Green Zone (which was the heart of the Iraqi government) while overrunning 
Iraqi Security Forces checkpoints on the outskirts of the neighborhood205.  This 
forced the Americans and Iraqi Security Forces to react, whilst before they had been 
content to leave the isolated neighborhood alone.  With the Iraqi Army focused on 
operations in Basra the Americans wanted to limit their advance into Sadr City 
because it was the most anti-American place in all of Iraq and there was little chance 
of convincing the civilians to break with the Jaish al-Mahdi.  Instead the Americans 
began their advance from the south and only advanced about a third of the way into 
the neighborhood, halting at the major thoroughfare of Quds Street, north of which 
the Jaish al-Mahdi’s mortars and rockets would be out of range of the Green Zone206.  
Meanwhile other American and Iraq units would conduct minor attacks on the other 
sides of Sadr City to retake the captured checkpoints and ensure Sadr City remained 
isolated.  Meanwhile intense raids by Special Operations and missile strikes from 
drones aggressively attacked the Jaish al-Mahdi leaders and militant networks.  The 
Jaish al-Mahdi intensely resisted American movements with almost constant IED, 
sniper and RPG attacks; when the Americans had reached Quds Street the Jaish al-
Mahdi continued to infiltrate through American lines to attack the Green Zone.  In 
reaction the Americans began to construct a 4.7-kilometer long wall made up of 
twelve-foot tall concrete barriers.  This caused one last-ditch by hundreds of Jaish al-
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Mahdi fighters to stop its construction, over the following three weeks the Americans 
were successful in constructing the wall while also killing an estimated 700 Jaish al-
Mahdi fighters207.   
By early May it was obvious that the Jaish al-Mahdi was incapable of 
stopping the Americans and Iraqi Security Forces and much like Basra continued 
fighting would just end in the destruction of his forces, so he quietly accepted Iranian 
attempts to negotiate a ceasefire between his supporters and the Iraqi government, but 
left the Americans out.  The conditions of the ceasefire were that north of Quds street 
the only permanent presence would be that of the Iraqi Security Forces, though the 
Americans would be allowed to send in temporary support if the Iraqi Security Forces 
ran into trouble; there would be no abuse or unwarranted arrest of Jaish al-Mahdi 
members; there would be no abuse of Iraqi civilians; and that the al-Quds wall would 
eventually be removed208. 
The Jaish al-Mahdi is Reorganized 
The moves against the Jaish al-Mahdi in Basra and Baghdad were by a newly 
emboldened Shi’a led Iraqi government and newly strengthened Iraqi Security 
Forces.  Before the Surge they were unable to confront Sadr due to fears that it would 
bring down the government and the Iraqi Security Forces suffered from corruption, 
desertions and incompetency.  Now the Iraqi Government was willing and able to 
directly confront the Sadr, and the Iraqi Security Forces were able to plan and 
implement operations with decreasing American support to confront and defeat the 
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Jaish al-Mahdi and that they would continue to do so.  This meant that the Jaish al-
Mahdi was now a liability instead of an asset to his power. 
So on June 13, 2008 Sadr announced that he was splitting the Jaish al-Mahdi 
into two wings.  The larger of these wings was the Politics and Social Services Group 
that was to wage cultural jihad against “the Western ideology and liberate the minds 
from domination and globalization.”  This wing would also take a Hezbollah-like role 
of building popular support by providing essential basic services that the Iraqi 
government was unable to.  Though the Politics and Social Services Group would not 
run candidates in the direct elections, they would have a degree of influence by 
supporting independents within it209. 
 The second wing of the reorganized Jaish al-Mahdi was the one that would 
retain weapons as “The Special Companies”. To provide clarification on July 30 Sadr 
spelled out the rules for this wing in a letter to his supporters which are: 
• Do not target civilians.  
• Do not target the government, even if it is (unfair) for some. That is not permitted. 
• If the government stands by the occupiers against the resistance in the field of battle, the 
resistance must limit its damage as much as possible and according to what is necessary. 
• Limit weapons to the hands of the specialized resistance, and none others. 
• Military action of the resistance should not be harmful to the people. 
• Absolutely avoid military actions in cities. 
• Preserve the centrality of command in receiving military orders from its known marjaia, 
because its dispersion will cause great damage and the greatest blight. 
• It is not permitted to carry weapons – only for the specialized resistance. Everyone else will 
be specialized in (cultural jihad). Obey the terms and regulations that have been recently 
issued. 
• Those who want to join the honorable Iraqi resistance have to commit to the terms made 
by the known leadership in order to join. Naturally (these) cannot be revealed, for the most 
important basis of resistance is preserving secrecy by all means. 
• Do not damage the people’s services, like electricity, water and others. 
• Do not use the governmental properties, or involve them in resistance actions, where there 
is no permission from the legitimate marjaia [Shi’a religious leaders]. That is stressed after the 
current government claims it is (politically) trying to drive the occupier out.210 	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These policies were a radical departure from the earlier actions of the Jaish al-Mahdi 
wherein it supported death squads, attacked the Iraqi government, and used civilian 
areas for cover when attacking the Americans.  The end result was that the Surge and 
Spring 2008 fighting had forced the Jaish al-Mahdi to disarm and at least tacitly 
participate in the government.  Though the Jaish al-Mahdi was still vehemently anti-
American, attacks would be limited to their bases and supply routes. 
The “Status of Forces Agreement” and the Beginning of the End 
 As the security situation stabilized in the early summer and it became 
increasingly apparent that the Iraqi government and military were capable of standing 
on their own it opened the door for a graduated American withdrawal that could leave 
a stable Iraq.  Talks of an official Status of Forces agreement began in January, but 
kicked off in earnest after the Spring 2008 fighting.  The agreement itself was 
contentious, especially because the Americans refused to sign an agreement whereby 
US troops were subject to Iraqi Law211.  Ultimately pressure of the impending 
expiration of the 2003 United Nations Mandate (which had been extended) that would 
have forced the Americans to leave by December 31, 2008 drove the Iraqi 
government to negotiate an agreement.  This was also a sign of how all the parities 
were unsure of victory in a potential civil war and understood that they probably 
couldn’t prevent one without American assistance.   
 The Status of Forces Agreement was ultimately signed on November 16, 2008 
and ratified by the American Congress and Iraqi Parliament soon after.  The 	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agreement set a timetable for a gradual withdrawal from Iraq both in terms of 
missions and troops.  The primary focus of the mission would gradually continue to 
shift away from direct combat operations to that of advice and assistance.  Permanent 
American forces would have to be out of the cities by June 29, 2009, after which 
point they would have to have Iraqi Security Force escort to enter them (with 
exceptions), with a total troop withdrawal no later than December 31, 2011212.  Later, 
President Obama would add to this timetable announcing that all combat troops 
would be withdrawn by August 31, 2010213 meaning that the sole remaining mission 
of the Americans would be to advise and assist the Iraqis. 
 Ultimately the Status of Forces Agreement would be the document that guided 
the eventual American drawdown in a measured, practical and methodical way.  The 
SOFA also left open the possibility, even expectation by many, of a successor treaty 
whereby the Americans were invited to stay but in more limited numbers with a more 
focused mission. 
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Conclusion 
The “Petraeus Doctrine” 
 When General Petraeus decided to rewrite American counter-insurgency 
doctrine in 2005 few would have predicted that just over two years later he would be 
testifying to Congress as to having used it as the basis for a successful counter-
offensive.  The Petraeus Doctrine’s strategies and tactics offered a radical alternative 
to the American uses of hard power to try and kill their way out of an insurgency, by 
synthesizing a use of Soft Power to focus on breaking civilian support and offering 
rehabilitation for former insurgents while also using precision Hard Power to kill or 
capture those how continued to resist.  Though the Petraeus Doctrine was a tool for 
the ultimate success of the Surge it did not shape the environment necessary for its 
success, but took advantage of a series of events that had caused the environment and 
attitudes on the ground to be conducive for its success. 
Lessons of the Early War 
 In the immediate wake of the invasion there was no cohesive American 
counter-insurgency doctrine and as the insurgency began to grow in the months 
following the invasion commanders increasingly had to devise their own strategies. 
Most of the commander’s strategies were somewhere between General Odierno’s use 
of Hard Power to close with and destroy the insurgents and that of General Petraeus’s 
use of Soft Power to encourage Iraqis to abandon the insurgency in the name of 
engagement and reconstruction.   
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 As the years went on the Americans found themselves using more and more 
hard power to kill increasing number of insurgents while the insurgency continued to 
grow in strength and influence.  Eventually the Americans began to believe that they 
were causing the violence and acting as “antibodies” within the community so after 
clearing an area of the insurgency (and not defeating it) the Americans would hand 
over control responsibility for holding the ground as rapidly as possible to the Iraqi 
Security Forces; time and time again the insurgents re-infiltrated and reasserted 
control by attacking, sieging and intimidating the Iraqi Security Forces.  The 
culmination of the failure of conventional use of Hard Power climaxed during the 
spectacular failure of Operations Together Forward I and II, during which violence 
actually increased.  By the time the Petraeus Doctrine was introduced the debate was 
not about what approach to take to defeat the insurgency, but whether it was even 
possible.  
A Long War 
 Early in the Iraq War, a number of mistakes alienated the Iraqis and pushed 
them directly into the hands of the insurgency.  Idealistic civilians flocked to Baghdad 
in hopes of helping to build a liberal democracy firmly rooted in Western tradition.  
By 2006 the failure of nation building was apparent, the Iraqi “democracy” was now 
Shi’a controlled and more accountable to radical Shi’a clerics than citizens of Iraq.  
These failures meant that the focus shifted to putting pressure on the Iraqi 
government to be mostly not corrupt and just stable enough to allow the Americans to 
save face, declare victory, and pull out.  As idealistic rhetoric faded so did the view of 
many of Iraqis that the ultimate goal of the Americans was neocolonialism. 
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The American military remembered the quick, cheap, grand victory of the Gulf War 
and deploying soldiers looked forward to recreating its success, real world application 
of what they spent entire careers training to do (namely employing hard power) and 
receiving their coveted combat awards. While veteran American soldiers found 
themselves in a Groundhog’s Day-like situation of multiple combat tours, being sent 
back to fight the same battles, in the same places, all in the face of a rising casualty 
count all the while watching the Army and Marine Corps deteriorate in front of them.  
Incoming commanders began to take risks with radical tactics, such as Colonel 
McMaster’s strategy in Tal Afar and actions such as Colonel MacFarland’s outright 
alliance with former insurgents. 
When the Petraeus Doctrine went into effect in the winter of 2006 the Iraq 
War was moving into its fourth year.  Political idealism of liberal democracy had 
been abandoned in favor of pragmatically building an Iraqi government that was just 
strong enough to not collapse in the face of an American withdrawal.  American 
soldiers paid for the failure of their early war tactics to defeat the insurgency, 
commanders were risking everything on radical new approaches just to try something 
different, because the old approaches were certain to fail.  When the Petraeus 
Doctrine went into effect it did so in a Force that was beaten, weary and desperate to 
try anything just to not lose. 
The Iraqi Security Forces 
 On May 16, 2003 with Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number Two 
dissolved the large, stable, mostly non-sectarian Iraqi Army.  For the next five years 
they would try to recreate just that.   The Americans now found themselves having to 
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build a complex institution in the face of rising combat.  Early war attempts to do so 
in haste failed completely with the widespread incompetence and desertions in the 
Spring 2004 fighting.  When General Petraeus returned to Iraqi in June 2004 to 
overhaul the training of the Iraqi Security Forces he implemented a methodical 
bottom up approach and though it would ultimately be successful, it would be years 
before the Iraqi Security Forces were an asset instead of a drain on American 
resources.  By the time of the Surge, these forces were strong enough to be an asset to 
the Americans during joint operations, instead of the drain they had been earlier.  By 
the end of the Surge the Iraqi Security Forces were large enough and trained enough 
to conduct operations completely independently of the Americans.  Before 2006 it is 
doubtful that Surge operations could have been successful because the Iraqi Army 
just hadn’t had enough time to gain the size and competency to assume responsibility 
for security. 
Al-Askari and Haditha 
 The civil war that was sparked by the Al-Askari Mosque bombing and the 
Haditha Killings were other vital steps on the road to Surge.  These events’ portrayal 
in the media put massive pressures, especially after Republican defeats in the mid-
term elections, on the Bush Administration to acknowledge that the war was being 
lost and to change course.  This would embolden the Bush Administration to order 
one last gamble that guaranteed an increased loss of blood and treasure, but was the 
only hope for the ability to declare anything resembling victory. 
Baghdad is Ethnically Cleansed 
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 By the spring of 2007 Shi’a death squads had had more than a year to 
successful carry out a program of brutally ethnically cleansing Baghdad.  In 2003 
most of Baghdad was a mixed city where Sunni and Shia had been living side by side 
for centuries, by late 2006 it was divided between Shi’a and Sunni (who had been 
driven into their historical strongholds and found their numbers in Baghdad cut in 
half) neighborhoods.  This meant the violence had shifted to neighborhood on 
neighborhood from neighbor on neighbor and meant that the Americans could isolate 
the neighborhoods as a means of reducing sectarian fighting leaving them only having 
to fight the insurgents and not keep Sunni and Shi’a apart. 
The Insurgents Overplay their Hand 
Within the Shi’a neighborhoods the locals now had less fear of their neighbors 
and the militias within their neighborhoods began to look less like protectors and 
more like common thugs more concerned with money and power that protecting the 
locals or driving the Americans out.  Within Sunni areas Al-Qaeda in Iraq was losing 
local support by implementing Sharia in a culture that had never seen it, attacking 
fellow Muslims while claiming to be pious Muslims, and failing to protect the Sunni 
from the Shi’a death squads.  This meant that during 2006 the insurgents overplayed 
their hand and locals would support the Iraqi government and tolerate Americans in 
neighborhoods because their desire for security from Al Qaeda in Iraq or the Jaish al-
Mahdi overrode cultural xenophobia.  This further strengthened Iraqi perceptions 
American domestic politics would force an eventual withdrawal. 
Successes of the Surge 
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 The Surge was successful in achieving its military goals.  Using Smart Power 
the Americans successfully isolated and advanced into neighborhoods in Baghdad, 
break the insurgency from the locals, and then kill or capture insurgents that could not 
be brought back into society.  Rule of law was restored and Baghdad began to 
reconstruct infrastructure damaged from years of fighting.  During the fall of 2007 the 
insurgency had been sufficiently weakened and the Iraqi Security Forces strengthened 
to the point that the balance of power had definitively shifted so that the Americans 
could begin to shut down their combat outposts and withdraw their forces.  As the 
insurgency was defeated there was much less radical Sunni and Shi’a pressure on the 
Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government resulting in increased legitimacy and 
stability. 
Sadr 
 By the spring and summer of 2008 the Iraqi Security Forces felt themselves 
strong enough to attack Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi directly.  This was a very telling move 
by the Shi’a led government, only a year before to do so could have brought down the 
government.  Now a confrontation would strengthen it.  Though the Battles of Basra 
and Sadr city did not destroy the Jaish al-Mahdi (it actually fought them to a 
standstill) it illustrated that continued violent resistance against the government risked 
its complete destruction.  When Sadr reorganized the Jaish al Mahdi in June 2008 it 
was into a predominate political organization and indicative of how the fighting had 
forced even the most powerful organization to abandon violence for politics. 
The Petraeus Doctrine as a Success 
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 Ultimately the Surge was a success; as the insurgents were defeated violence 
in Baghdad dropped, the Iraqi Security Forces proved capable of maintaining security 
and the Americans were able to leave.  Central to this was the Smart Power of the 
Petraeus Doctrine and though it drove the success of the Surge, it was simply the 
cook who baked it.  The ingredients were: a long war that had abandoned idealism for 
pragmatism and the utter failure of conventional Hard Power that left a military 
willing to try anything; improved Iraqi Security Forces that were the product of a 
long-term training program; domestic pressures in the media and Congress that forced 
the Bush Administration to acknowledge how badly things had deteriorated and have 
no choice but to do something; the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad that had shifted the 
violence from neighbor-on-neighbor to neighborhood-on-neighborhood; and an 
insurgency that had overplayed its hand combined with American domestic politics to 
make the Americans a more temporary and appealing option than the insurgencies. 
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